Projects of Improvement, Continuities of Neglect: Re-Fragmenting the Periphery in Southern Rural Jordan

Katharina Lenner

This paper analyzes projects of improvement and continuities of neglect found in two peripheral regions in the rural south of Jordan. These areas have been framed as poverty pockets and singled out for special attention. Yet, despite the multitude of improvement projects targeting them since 1990, they have remained on the periphery. I argue that this has resulted from certain dynamics found within current strategies of intervention. These put people in their place as “locals” and render their concerns inferior to “national” or “global” interests. Accordingly, the transformations witnessed are best described as a socio-spatial re-fragmentation of governing strategies.

Keywords: Periphery; Re-Fragmentation; Jordan; Development; Poverty Alleviation; Rural

Introduction
Peripheries are made. They are shaped by spatially selective capital investment policies as much as by differential governmental representations of spaces, populations, and practices. While early works, grounded in world systems theory, largely focused on structural macroeconomic dimensions of peripherality, more recent contributions that are based on critical human geography have made it possible to see peripheralization as process and practice. This includes a discursive dimension (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann; Lefebvre). Such dynamics have only recently become a focus of scholarly attention in Middle East area studies, especially in political science accounts of state-formation and development. This is not least due to the realization that spaces “beyond the center” are central for understanding the genesis of the Arab revolutions (Clark; Hoffmann, Bouziane, and Harders).

In this article, I look at the history, dynamics and practices of peripheralization in southern rural Jordan. I explore how socio-economic and discursive forms of marginalization have unfolded over time, and to what degree these dynamics have changed since the 1990s/2000s when poverty alleviation and local development first became the...
dominant paradigm for improvement projects in Jordan's rural areas. I focus on two (sub-) districts that have recently been singled out for particular concern under this new paradigm. Wadi Araba, a part of Jordan's southern bādiya (steppe) located in the governorate of Aqaba, has long recorded the highest poverty rates of anywhere in the country. In the past few years, this has turned it into a laboratory for poverty alleviation interventions. Busayra, located in the highlands of the governorate of Tafila, has lower poverty rates but a richer history of intervention. Due to the nearby presence of the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) and its flagship Dana Biosphere Reserve, interventions taking place in Busayra in the name of poverty alleviation and local development are particularly entwined with conservation and eco-tourism initiatives. The two areas represent both sides of the common differentiation of rural Jordan into steppe and highland areas where rain-fed agriculture is common. While never an absolute distinction, the two types of areas are characterized by different ecologies, sources of livelihood, and modes of living. These range from fully and semi-nomadic to sedentary (Tell, The Social 27-39). A comparison of the two settings sheds light on if and how peripheralization depends on these different contexts.

In what follows, I first give an overview of the limited place that Busayra and Wadi Araba have had in broader projects of development throughout the process of state-formation. I demonstrate that the marginalization of both areas has resulted from not only their longstanding dependence on the state, but also from their history of neglect, fragmentation, and selective governmental intervention. Subsequently, I trace how agencies and regulatory bodies nominally dealing with poverty alleviation and local development in the south of Jordan have proliferated since the 1990s. Some of the schemes currently implemented in these localities echo previous welfarist or developmental philosophies. Others reflect current developmental fashions such as the principles of participation and ownership. Based on observing their operation in the two areas, I argue that rather than being distinct in their approaches, these different interventions follow similar organizational goals. In effect, they exclude local populations from a meaningful role in developmental initiatives and put them in their place as “locals.” I frame this transformation over time as a process of re-fragmentation of government and as a relative continuity of neglect, which is articulated through the spatial Othering of the respective areas and populations. I further argue that peripheralization occurs not only on an (economic) macro-level, but also in the daily operations and framings of different agencies of improvement.

Methodologically, this article is based on a close reading of not only the available academic literature, but also of the reams of gray literature on the two areas produced by different governing agencies over the past 35 years. I also draw extensively on interviews and participant observations that were conducted with and among actors involved in improvement projects there. This fieldwork took place in Amman, the provincial capitals Tafila and Aqaba, and the areas themselves over the course of various stays in Jordan between 2007 and 2013. In Busayra and Wadi Araba, I focused on community-based organizations and local governmental institutions, particularly municipalities.

A History of State Dependence, Neglect and Selective Intervention

Framing the rural south of Jordan as peripheral may seem counter-intuitive to analysts of Jordanian history and politics. One of the most prevalent narratives about Jordan is, after all, that its rural population of Transjordanians and East Bankers has been a privileged recipient of state
largesse. Socio-economic development, so the common narrative goes, has strongly relied on the public sector and military as employers and providers of services and social security. Transfers peaked during the 1970s and early 1980s—a period frequently described as the “golden age” of the Jordanian welfare state. This expansion of welfare—made possible by high levels of political aid from the Gulf and other donors—secured rural inhabitants’ loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy, whereas, in the more mixed populations of urban areas, the state took on a much less pronounced role (e.g., Baylouny; Brynen). Such a narrative is not only common in political science analyses of Jordan, but also among policy-shapers involved in improvement projects. Yet on closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the welfare regime in southern Jordan has been far from universal. It has exhibited fragmentations along overlapping class, gender, spatial, and clientelist lines, however the spatial dimension is probably the most salient. While the central state and military undoubtedly played seminal roles in this part of the country, there is also ample evidence of neglect or, at best, selective intervention. Much like for the country at large, the history of developmental interventions in the south is intricately connected with processes of state formation. The area came under Ottoman control significantly later than more northern provinces, yet remained largely under the rule of local orders until the Ottoman regime collapsed in World War I (Rogan). The primary means through which the Hashemites and British mandate officials consolidated the new state of Transjordan in the post-war era were the expansion of both the army and the public sector, as well as land registration.

In the southern bādiya, the Hashemites rewarded a number of local ʿashāʾir (kinship networks), which had supported them during the Arab revolt against the Ottomans, with a special status as Bedouin tribes. This came with subsidies and land for their leaders (e.g., Baumgarten 24-26; Bocco, “Espaces étatiques” 148), preferential recruitment of Bedouins into the Desert Patrol, and employment in public works. Tax exemptions for the most needy helped prevent famines in the 1920s and 1930s, when the previous livelihoods of local pastoralist communities were under severe threat. These welfarist interventions effectively fixed the economic dependence and political loyalty of the Bedouin to the newly established monarchy (Bocco and Tell). The army, which has since become a major employer, educator, and service provider for some of the local kinship networks, remains a strong presence in the area (Abu Jaber, Gharaibeh, and Hill 37; Dajani 13-14; Tarawneh 98-100).

In the southern highlands, employment in the army and public sector only became a dominant feature during World War II. The importance of these sectors continued to grow throughout the 1950s and 1960s, bringing financial security, social mobility, and educational possibilities to many households. The available opportunities were further enhanced during the 1980s with the establishment of a state-owned cement factory and the exploitation of a nearby mine. In this way, salaried work became a primary strand of household survival strategies, alongside agricultural work (on privately owned plots or as sharecroppers), gardening, and herding (Lancaster and Lancaster, “Dana Reserve;” Palmer et al. 45; Tell, The Social 120-21).

In comparison to military and public sector employment, land settlement played a more ambivalent role. In the cultivable areas in the highlands, the British land tax reform and the land settlement that followed successfully tied most cultivators to the newly established state. At the same time, many tribal land claims to uncultivated lands were not formally recognized. Although more land passed into private ownership in the highlands than in Wadi
Araba, significant parts of Busayra were declared state land (e.g., as forest land, ḥaraj, reserves of the Ministry of Agriculture or, later on, as protected area). This severely restricted access to these lands by local populations for grazing, firewood collecting, and other activities. In the bādiya, even tilled land was not registered under individual names, but formally remained part of the treasury. This means that all of Wadi Araba was declared state-owned property. While formal and informal practices of land distribution allowed for a degree of accommodating tribal spaces within newly asserted state spaces, land settlement has also proven a source of grievance for many in the local populations. It has remained a point of contention and negotiation until today (Bocco, “Espaces étatiques” 147; Lancaster and Lancaster, People 25; Palmer et al. 44-45). In spite of this history of expanding public sector employment and land distribution, accounts of the developmental history of these areas also show a considerable amount of neglect or, at best, selective engagement by governing agencies. As Aihwa Ong (“Graduated Sovereignty,” Neoliberalism) reminds us, sovereignty is fragmented within a nominal nation-state container and never extends evenly across a territory. Actual, spatially graduated strategies of rule reflect which spaces are considered important or (potentially) productive by governing agencies. In consequence, any given territory may contain multiple forms of socio-spatial sovereignty. These include zones of privilege, where populations deemed core assets to the country’s economy train, live and work; refugee camps, which are primarily spaces of discipline and control; as well as “internal colonies of poverty and neglect” (Ong, Neoliberalism 84), where neither the territory nor its population are deemed valuable.

For decades, infrastructural and social development in the rural south were largely by-products of other initiatives rather than goals in themselves (Baumgarten 137-43). Wadi Araba had, until recent years, been particularly neglected. It shares a border with Israel and was primarily treated as a security zone well into the 1990s. This designation effectively isolated most of Wadi Araba’s inhabitants from the rest of the country. Even though the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), a governmental regional planning agency established in 1977, was nominally responsible for the development of Wadi Araba, this remote jurisdiction did not receive much attention (e.g., Dajani 1; Tarawneh 7-8). This neglect was mirrored and compounded by the unwillingness of urban practitioners assigned to the area (e.g., as engineers or doctors) to understand local social dynamics in what they perceived to be a marginal space with harsh living conditions and uneducated people (Bocco, “Ingénieurs-agronomes” 271-75; Tarawneh 10, 102-3).

This marginal position reflects the broader developmental history of the country. In the first place, it was a corollary of the pronounced urban bias that has characterized development strategies since the inception of the state, but which became particularly pronounced during the 1970s. Based not least on the substantial influence of Jordan’s businessmen, this bias resulted in the lion’s share of industrial investments, government expenditure, services, and infrastructure going to the governorate of Amman (Malkawi; Tell, “The Politics” 90). Moreover, the rural south’s peripheralization was an effect of a strategic focus on developing irrigated agriculture in the northern Jordan Valley. This resulted in a governmental neglect of not only other parts of the Jordan Rift Valley, such as Wadi Araba, but also of the rain-fed farming practiced in the highlands around Busayra. Furthermore, the lack of developmental initiatives in the area may have been due to the fact that the local kinship networks were not considered relevant by the political center.² Wadi Araba and, to a lesser degree,
Busayra, are thus captured in what Ong describes as “internal colonies of poverty and neglect” (Ong, Neoliberalism 84).

This undesirable status is reflected in the areas’ poor quality schools and health facilities, as well as in the late arrival of permanent housing, electrification, and piped water (Abu Jaber, Gharaiibeh, and Hill 37; Dajani 22, 29; Tarawneh 101-02).

Overall service levels in Busayra were slightly better than in Wadi Araba, with a gradual expansion of schools, electricity, health services, transportation, and communication services to accessible villages and towns over the course of the 1970s. This might be due to the earlier establishment of basic infrastructure (such as a road system) and permanent housing in the highlands. However, the quality and accessibility of services were reported as relatively poor, and problems comparable to those mentioned for Wadi Araba were identified. Villages off the main roads, such as Dana, were not even formally included in plans to widen service coverage (Biewers 16; MMRAE and JICA 126-27; ZENID 4). Another indicator of neglect and marginality were the low income levels prevalent in both areas. Indeed, in the late 1980s, Busayra and Wadi Araba were estimated as having the lowest income levels in the country (Jordan Valley Authority 13-14; Ministry of Social Development, pt. 4:31, 89).

The few planned development initiatives registered in both areas did not result from an overall development scheme but were rather instituted piecemeal. They depended on who had an eye for the area at any given moment, and how their initiatives were embedded in broader developmental and political considerations. For example, the establishment of irrigated agriculture in Wadi Araba, which created the major settlement of Graygra in the late 1970s, goes back to a 1970s-era power struggle between two political factions in Amman. One camp wanted to focus rural development strategies on the northern Jordan Valley, the borderland that divides the Jordanian East Bank from the occupied territories in the West Bank. The minority opposing camp saw this as implicitly accepting the normalization of relations with Israel, and thus favored projects that improved farming in the less politically sensitive—and better watered—valleys descending from the Transjordan plateau. Establishing irrigated agriculture in Graygra was a way to appease the leader of the opposition, Sharif Nasser ibn Jamil, who was an uncle of King Hussein and a politically powerful military commander. The project was short-lived, however, as local populations were left to their own devices after they began to demand a greater share of the profits from their royal patrons. Bereft of equipment or accumulated knowledge about marketing and transportation of the produce, they had to re-establish everything from scratch (e.g., Baumgarten 83-84; Lancaster and Lancaster, People 183-84; Tarawneh 106-07).

Such indicators and anecdotes illuminate that the vast majority of inhabitants of southern rural Jordan were hardly privileged recipients of public largesse. While parts of southern Jordan—such as the eastern parts of Ma'an governorate, or the city of Aqaba—were considered relevant at times (e.g., Bocco, “Ingénieurs-Agronomes;” Debruyne), areas such as Busayra and Wadi Araba were clearly marginalized. In spite of the relevance of the military and public sector, social development projects were pursued on an ad-hoc basis. Wadi Araba and Busayra were not considered relevant in a developmental sense for many decades, and remained on the socio-economic and political fringes.

Poverty Alleviation and the Proliferation of Improvement Agencies This changed with the onset of the poverty alleviation agenda. One of the most notable transformations of the last twenty years, and even more so during the last decade, has been a proliferation of agen-
cies and regulatory bodies charged with poverty alleviation or local development in these areas. This paradigm, which promotes individual or collective entrepreneurial activities in specific localities, gained momentum in Jordan in the context of on-going structural adjustment policies, which brought freezes on public sector employment, the privatization of previously state-owned enterprises, and the decline of real wages. Poverty alleviation and local development policies were, in many ways, introduced to counterbalance the effects of these broader measures and dynamics (Lenner, “Die lokale Übersetzung”). This shift has caused the rural south of Jordan, including Wadi Araba and Busayra to attract much more attention as spaces of improvement.

While there have been various drivers of this transformation, I would like to single out two for discussion. The first is the way in which the sustainable development discourse, which emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a hybrid of conservation and development discourses, materialized in Jordan. It was picked up by the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) and fed into its establishment in 1993 of the Dana Biosphere Reserve, the largest protected area in the country that spans parts of Busayra and Wadi Araba. Heavily funded and infused with expertise by global agencies like the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and USAID, RSCN experimented with different socio-economic projects in and around the reserve that sought to “make conservation pay” for local populations (Irani and Johnson).

Another important moment that channeled attention to Wadi Araba and Busayra was their recent designation as poverty pockets (in 2004/2005 and 2008, respectively). Defined as areas with a poverty rate of more than 25 percent, poverty pockets are a specialized targeting scheme that has attracted the attention of various government as well as donor-funded projects since its inception in 2004 (Lenner, “Poverty”). In this way, the focus on poverty alleviation and local development, which has marked international development interventions since the mid-to late 1990s, has contributed to a re-valuation of these marginalized areas.

While agencies of improvement were already present before the 1990s, they multiplied and diversified in type over the next twenty years. They now run the gamut from regional planning agencies, like JVA and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), to (semi-) governmental agencies like the Hashemite Fund for the Development of the Jordanian Badia, to royal NGOs like RSCN, the Jordan River Foundation (JRF), and the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD). Additionally, private sector companies like the French Lafarge, which owns most of the nearby, formerly state-run cement factory, engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in and around Busayra. Projects like UNDP-GEF’s small grants program, various international NGOs, and a host of donor-funded initiatives interacting with local “partners” complete this list.

Given the diversity of the actors at play, it is perhaps unsurprising that not everybody maintains the same objectives. The various agencies present in Busayra and Wadi Araba pursue a variety of improvement strategies. JRF follows a more activating, participatory methodology that, in theory at least, encourages poor communities to “own” the improvement projects and pull themselves out of poverty by their own bootstraps. Others, such as JVA or ASEZA, are mainly concerned with improving infrastructure. They pursue a top-down approach dominated by an engineering model, which has little conceptual space for input from the target populations. In between are myriad approaches mainly focusing on employment-generation, material benefits, and the charitable provision of the basic necessities of life (housing, food, etc.) to
the poor and needy. So what has really changed? To what degree have these different interventions altered the marginal socio-economic and discursive position of these areas?

**Putting People in Their Place**

I argue that there is a relative continuity of neglect and marginalization. This partly stems from the dominant poverty alleviation and local development agenda in itself. According to its basic premises, the leveling of socio-spatial inequalities is no longer the responsibility of the state. Claims for inclusion into governmental service provision therefore appear illegitimate, and people in the target areas are made accountable for the success or failure of locally-confined projects of improvement. They are thereby disconnected from broader macro-economic strategies and policies, which remain focused on urban areas (Craig and Porter; High).

This marginalization is furthermore an effect of the way in which interventions operate in practice. By following a number of programs and projects, I have found that more than specific policy goals and approaches, it is their organizational goals, procedures, and contexts that shape the dynamics of poverty alleviation and local development. Geared towards organizational maintenance and survival, they produce various hierarchies between management and labor or trustees and beneficiaries, even if their interventions nominally seek to achieve the opposite (Mosse, *Cultivating Development* 104; Shrestha 213). These dynamics include the overall administrative structure in which specific agencies find themselves, their relations with other organizations, as well as their internal procedures and interactions with partners or beneficiaries. These produce, often unintentionally, spatial hierarchies and the spatial Othering of those on the receiving end. This turns the populations of the target areas into “locals” and renders their concerns inferior and less valid than those of actors and agencies located on a supposedly higher scale.

Various dynamics interact to produce this effect. Firstly, intense competition for access to funding, political clout in Amman, and dominance in the field turns the nominal targets of intervention into a secondary concern. Project branding by different improvement agencies concerned with visibility easily subordinates the aim of people’s empowerment to that of institutional aggrandizement. Moreover, regulatory blurriness concerning the roles and responsibilities of several sub-national administrative units and para-statals puts “local” policy-shapers at a loss to distinguish who governs them and to whom they should turn with their concerns. This disorientation also results from governmental as well as non-governmental agencies’ lack of transparency regarding their goals, agendas, and budgets. Adopting standard procedures in project planning and implementation is another organizational dynamic that converts the concerns of target populations into technical problems, making them appear particular and “local.” Project managers of agencies like JVA or ASEZA will, when asked about cooperation with local associations, refer to their “standard engineering model” and thereby deflect demands to adapt projects to people’s wishes. Yet standard procedures are also pursued by agencies following more “participatory” approaches. Here, participation is limited to particular formats and tends to encompass only specific activities of the implementing organization (Mosse, “People’s Knowledge”). Some of these, e.g. the incessant training activities offered by agencies like JRF, are perceived by local associations as not answering to their actual needs. Furthermore, many agencies pursue what I call the “path of least resistance.” Rather than cooperating with place-based orga-
nizations or institutions in target areas directly, donors and government agencies often work through national-level intermediaries, which they perceive as more solid, relevant and reliable. The path of least resistance also includes focusing on highly visible or quickly obtainable interventions rather than those that might be most needed. This often entails working with the strong rather than the poor and marginalized, who might not have the prerequisites to make a project a nominal success. Finally, there are various ways of evading challenges when people are not willing to be put in their place. These include switching local “partners,” going it alone entirely, or blocking alternative local initiatives through better connections with governmental or donor organizations.

Such strategies are often justified with reference to superior, national, or global interests, such as conservation or the creation of an entrepreneurial mind-set. They are reinforced through culturalizations of the target populations as traditional, uneducated and unwilling to work. The oft-cited “lack of capacities,” for example, which so often provides an excuse for intervention, can quickly turn into an explanation for project failure or a reason for exclusion. This allows intervening agencies to avoid questioning the validity of their approaches, and to perpetuate their role as trustees of populations framed as deficient and needing help. Of course, local(ized) policy-shapers are not devoid of agency. They negotiate and challenge these dynamics, which are always fragile and precarious. Such interactions have raised the status of those individual brokers who have successfully used their connections, knowledge, and linguistic abilities to mediate between target areas and outside agencies. Yet overall, these dynamics serve to put the latter in their place as locals. They reinforce spatial hierarchies by situating “the local” (community) either at the bottom, or as encompassed by broader circles of authority, including “the national” (the state) and the system of nation-states (Ferguson and Gupta; van Aken 7). These dynamics of emplacement, and the organizational forms from which they stem, render target groups and their concerns local and thus inferior to supposedly broader, more encompassing logics of (state and non-state) implementing agencies. They selectively include local dynamics and populations, but also exclude them in many ways.

While the idioms and specific procedures have changed, such discursive and procedural forms of socio-spatial Othering are integral to processes of peripheralization. I argue that such methods of putting people in their place, which often involve images of deficiency and socio-spatial inferiority, constitute a revised and renewed form of peripheralization in the era of the post-Washington consensus and its poverty alleviation agenda.

**Conclusion: Re-Fragmenting Government in Rural Jordan**

Tracing the trajectories of government and development from the vantage point of two (sub-) districts in rural southern Jordan shows that governmental strategies of improvement never addressed the entirety of the nation or population of Jordan. They were always assembled and fragmented, and their boundaries rarely corresponded to those of the nation state. While processes of state-formation in Wadi Araba and Busayra created lasting relations of dependency on central state agencies and the military there, its inhabitants were not privileged recipients of attention or state largesse. In spite of piecemeal initiatives, they were overlooked by broader development strategies that focused almost entirely on urban areas in the northwest of the country and the northern Jordan Valley. Their neglect was compounded by narratives of backwardness, which kept urbanized professionals from engaging with the concerns of local inhabitants. These areas were thus
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not only marginalized in socio-economic terms, but also discursively Othered. Their recent discovery as areas of planned intervention has only changed this peripheralization to a limited extent. Governing agencies are certainly more interested in these areas than they used to be, not least because they have increasingly been framed as poor areas in need of intervention and “help for self-help.” Yet this does not mean that these areas and their inhabitants are somehow less spatially marginalized than they once were. This is partly due to the poverty alleviation agenda in itself, which could be considered another form of neglect as it places the responsibility for exiting poverty on the poor communities themselves. Moreover, it is a consequence of different agencies often pursuing their organizational goals at the expense of their policy goals. Many of the representations and dynamics that result from this prioritization continue to keep local populations in dependent, spatially inferior positions.

Peripheralization can thus still take place in areas that appear to be the focus of governing strategies. The central questions remain: what do these strategies entail and exclude? How do they link socio-economic development strategies in specific marginalized areas with those prevailing at larger scales, or how do they decouple the former from the latter? One needs to also consider the production of spatial hierarchies in the daily operations of development in specific target areas. These procedural and discursive forms of socio-spatial Othering need to be integrated more strongly into conceptualizations of peripheralization, and thereby make possible more fine-grained analyses of such processes in past and present. These two cases from different ecological and social contexts in rural Jordan show that peripheralization depends more on these overriding dynamics than on specific contexts. These dynamics have interacted with legacies of socio-spatial Othering in Busayra and Wadi Araba to perpetuate processes of peripheralization in spite of new governmental attention. Local populations, which have been excluded from dominant strategies of development for decades, remain dependent on trustees because they find it difficult to engage in currently fashionable projects of development without the requisite knowledge or training. This makes it possible for agencies to maintain their positions as trustees, thereby upholding their raison d’être. At the same time, at a broader level, these dynamics reaffirm the urban bias of the dominant socio-economic strategies pursued for decades. Treating poverty as a problem confined within certain geographic areas, and populations as responsible for their own improvement, decouples them from this broader political economy. This upholds the privileged status of those (businessmen and investors) who benefit from the urban bias.

I thus argue that current forms of emplacement constitute relative continuity with previous decades of neglect, despite the fact that the specific modes of intervention have changed in many cases. Neglect and emplacement have thus taken on different appearances over the years as they have been re-embedded into evolving governmental strategies and formations, but each new iteration is merely the next step in a continual process of re-fragmentation in the government of the social.

Katharina Lenner

is a political scientist and a post-doctoral fellow at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. She is also an associated researcher at the Institut français du Proche-Orient (ifpo) in Amman. Her research focuses on political transformation and the politics of development in the Arab Mashriq. She is particularly interested in how globalized blueprints for intervention take on a shape of their own as they become meaningful in specific contexts. In this vein, her PhD dissertation (FU Berlin, 2014) analyzes the politics of poverty alleviation and local development in Jordan.

email: katharina.lenner@eui.eu
5 Personal communication with Dr. Tariq Tall, American University of Beirut, Dec. 2013.

6 E.g., personal communication with mayor and staff of municipality in Wadi Araba, Oct. 2009.

7 The lack of transparency was highlighted by local policy-shapers with regard to the main initiatives in both Wadi Araba and Busayra (e.g., personal communication with an employee of the Local Development Unit of municipality in Wadi Araba, Apr. 2012, and personal communication with different CBO representatives in Dana, Mar. 2010, Apr. 2010, Sept. 2011).

8 E.g., personal communication with the director of Wadi Araba Development Unit, ASEZA, Oct. 2009.

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24 Personal communication with an RSCN community liaison officer in Dana, Sept. 2011, and personal communication with a JRF manager in Amman, Apr. 2010.

Notes

1 In ecological terms, the term bādiya refers to arid and semi-arid areas with less than 200 mm of rainfall per year. Socio-culturally speaking, the bādiya is inhabited by the Bedouin (in Arabic the two words have the same root). According to common estimates, the bādiya makes up more than 80 percent of the territory of Jordan (Bocco and Chatelard; “Jordan Badia”).

2 This is not least due to their small size, the troubled relation of some with the authorities, and the fact that others were latecomers to the area and were not officially counted among the Bedouin tribes (personal communication with Prof. Riccardo Bocco, Geneva University, Dec. 2013).

3 Personal communication with an elderly inhabitant of Qadisiya, Apr. 2011.

4 The segment of Israel’s border that is adjacent to Wadi Araba is not in dispute, as opposed to the border separating Jordan from the West Bank farther north.

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