In urban Egypt class is omnipresent in structuring people's lives and the social sphere as well as being operative in self-description. For understanding an individual's position within the horizontally and vertically stratified society, however, the usual distinction of three classes needs to be refined. Based on biographical interviews, I reconstruct what my interviewees consider their “Americanized Society” and try to grasp their self-categorization as upper middle class. In line with much of Bourdieu's thinking on social stratification, I treat their self-positioning as upper middle class as a form of discursive categorization which can only be understood if contextualized by the negative image of “the poor” and “the rich.” The Americanized Society, on the other hand, can best be conceptualized as a milieu where different classificatory principles intersect.

**Keywords:** Upper Middle Class; Milieu; Youth; Egypt; Westernization; Cosmopolitan Capital; Distinction

**Introduction**

With the January 25 uprising in Egypt, the international spotlight was on Cairo's bilingual youth with an upper (middle) class background. *Time Magazine* went so far as to call them “The Generation Changing the World.” Calling these young people who purportedly organized the revolution—all of whom belong to the upper and upper middle classes—a “generation” clearly had the potential to conceal the class-exclusive perspective of the observer and the role that class played or did not play in the January 25 uprising. This article makes a contribution to a better understanding of social stratification and identity in Egypt. It goes beyond the usual tripartite class scheme by describing a specific milieu, the “Americanized Society” (AS), and draws attention to the discursive politics of class-making.

The core empirical data on which this article's argument is built is drawn from twelve biographical interviews conducted in February and March 2011 with female students from the American University in Cairo (AUC).

The interpretative interview analysis based on the reconstruction of narrative identity posed a puzzle: while a considerable number of my interviewees could have been seen as belonging to the Egyptian (economic and cultural) elite, the majority of them were eager to position themselves as members of the Egyptian upper middle class. In addition, a collectivity labeled the “Americanized Society” was clearly identity-relevant. In this article, I will put forward the following interpretations: in line with much of Bourdieu's thinking on social stratification, I treat the self-positioning as upper middle class as a form of discursive categorization which can only be understood if contextualized by the negative image of “the poor” and “the rich.” The AS on the other hand can best be conceptualized as a milieu where different classificatory principles intersect.
Contemporary Egypt: Divided by an Unseen Economic Cleavage?

There is considerable agreement in academia that social stratification is omnipresent in structuring life, social relations, and space in Egypt (Barsoum; Bayat; Bayat and Denis; Denis; Raymond). Usually, this stratification is captured by the term “classes” (see for example Armbrust; Barsoum; De Koning; Ghannam, Remaking; Haeri; Ibrahim). At the same time though, various economic and social developments since the infitah, the “open door policy,” have changed the socioeconomic map of Egypt. Thus various academics have felt that the classical tripartite scheme has become deficient for mapping Egyptian society. They emphasize that, in particular, the middle class had been affected by the now “incongruous […] relations between education, occupation, and income” (Ibrahim 105). The increased difficulties of the middle class and the traditional elites to reproduce themselves as class is blamed on the privatization of education (Barsoum; Awad; Ibrahim; see Bourdieu, Unterschiede 221-37) and the decline of the public educational sector (Ibrahim 106; Handoussa et al. 46; De Koning). The consequence is a widening gap that runs through the middle class and splits Egyptian society in two halves: those in the upper segment are called the “cultured classes” (Barsoum), the “cosmopolitan classes” (De Koning) or simply the “dominant classes” (Haeri). According to Bayat, we see a society drifting apart, divided by a “social cleavage […] unseen in Egypt’s post-colonial history” (165). Armbrust, more concerned with the subjective and symbolic dimensions of class (-making), concedes that middle class “does not correlate with a material standard of living” (107). Rather, he sees the striving for higher education and the distinction from lower and upper class as defining feature of middle class identity (107-08). My interview partners also perceive Egypt as a “class-based” (Mariam) society, and they speak openly about the restrictions this produces for individuals (Noor; Samira; Laila). When the majority of my interview partners label themselves as members of the upper middle class, they also seem to confirm the idea of the rift dividing the country. At the same time, however, they are adamant to dissociate themselves from “the elite” or “the top classes.” And to further complicate matters, several of them identify strongest not with any class but with a social collectivity termed “the AS.” In order to understand those empirical phenomena we need an approach that pays attention to the symbolic dimensions of social stratification and the discursive production of distinction and division.

Theoretical Foundations: Class, Lifestyles, and the Politics of Class-ification

When it comes to conceptualizing “class” in social sciences Karl Marx and Max Weber are usually enlisted as the two earliest theoretical reference points. Most of the more recent theories on social stratification still build on those early classics—be it in terms of affirming or critiquing them. In the context of this article, the most relevant distinction between the two theorists’ notions of class is the foundation of social stratification. While in Marx it is primarily an economic theory (Wright; Burzan 15; Vester 125), Weber, too, treats “class” as deduced from economic factors but complements it with the concept of “status” (“Stand,” see “Wirtschaft” 179). By his introduction of status, partially defined by lifestyle (“Lebensführungsart”) and values (179), Weber captures to a certain degree the symbolic dimensions of social stratification and provides a fruitful foundation for the later development of lifestyle concepts. Yet, as “Weber’s comments on class are rather fragmentary” (Breen 34), the interrelation of the symbolic and economic in class and status remains problematic (see Vester 125). As a consequence, Bourdieu casts his seminal work Distinction as “an endeavor to rethink Max Weber’s opposition between class and Stand” (Distinction xii). Bourdieu emphasizes
that "the material (or 'economic') and the symbolic […] should not be viewed as alternative types of stratification giving rise to different types of social collectives" (Weininger 84). Instead, the "symbolic dimension" (Wacquant, "Symbolic" 3) and the "cultural dimension of lifestyles" (Burzan 135) become integrated in Bourdieu's class analysis. Consequentially, Bourdieu considers individuals to be positioned in society following from three factors: their amount of economic, cultural and social capital, the structure (i.e. the composition) of their capital, and their long-term trajectory within class relations (Bourdieu Distinction, "Ökonomisches Kapital;" Weininger; Burzan). All of these elements, in particular the "conversion rate" (Wacquant, "Symbolic" 4; Bourdieu, Unterschiede 202) between capital species are the object of continuous struggles. The three-faceted social space does not have any "natural" internal boundaries, it is through "constant, reciprocal acts of social classification" (Weininger 99) that social collectivities are produced. Two modalities of producing difference and drawing group boundaries are a) the "pre-reflexive 'play' of the habitus" (102) resulting in different lifestyles, and b) what Weininger calls "discursive categorization" (104). Lifestyle (as an assemblage of practices) is an expression of a person's location in society, mediated through the habitus (Weininger 90; Burzan 135-36). "Discursive categorization" refers to the discursive dimension of group politics:

Principles of division, […] function within and for the purposes of the struggle between social groups; in producing concepts, they produce groups […]. What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and systems […]. (Bourdieu, Distinction 480)

This is true also for classes, thus the importance of "class-ification struggles:" "Systems of classification would not be such a decisive object of struggle if they did not contribute to the existence of classes […]" (480). Weininger concludes that "any social collectivity is the result of the combined symbolic acts of self-classification and classification by others that are applied to its members (and, therefore, also, to those who are excluded)" (99). While Distinction clearly focuses on class-based classification, Bourdieu's concepts do not foreclose consideration of the importance of "other forms of domination" or "other stratifying factors—including gender, age, region, […] ethnicity" (Weininger 108). Due to this openness and the distinction of three capital species, Bourdieu provides a toolbox that can also be connected to the concept of "intersectionality" which has emerged mainly from gender and feminist studies (e.g. Arrighi; Becker-Schmidt; L. Weber; Degele and Winker; Winker and Degele). This is important within the framework of this article, as empirical manifestations of intersectionality clearly surface in the interviewees' narrative identity construction: in particular, it is the intersection of their specific age, gender, and class which results in considerable restrictions for their movement in physical and virtual space and their self-expression.

Notwithstanding the openness to include other stratifying factors, when applied to my interview material one weakness of Bourdieu's approach lies in the central role given to occupation in the (re)construction of social space and for understanding stratification. All of my interview partners are students, and their future occupation is not known. All of them describe considerable lifestyle differences if they compare themselves to their parents. The assumption that those "youths" or "dependents" class belonging could be deduced from that of their parents (as is usually done in the study of class) is unsatisfactory. The need to find a concept that
fits the inductively developed category of AS eventually lead me to adopt the concept of “milieu” which treats age and values as defining characteristics of a social collectivity (see the paragraph on The Americanized Milieu below for more details). To combine “class,” “lifestyle,” and “milieu” in one analysis is unorthodox insofar as it combines various generations of the study of social stratification. One core argument of diversifying theories of social inequality/stratification in the last decades has been that society becomes more individualized, and in a sense more complex. Thus, the “classical” forms of social collectivity—namely class and family—were losing importance for defining an individual’s position and identity. The concepts catching vertical stratification have thus been replaced by concepts like milieu, lifestyle, and others that focus on horizontal stratification.

My research on Egypt indicates that these two types of stratification are not mutually exclusive: Egypt’s society is still (or even increasingly) marked by strong vertical stratification. At the same time, though, we can observe a diversification of lifestyles, and the formation of social collectivities that are distinct from each other primarily on the horizontal level.

I argue, therefore, that vertical concepts like class and horizontal ones like lifestyle and milieu can be complementary rather than substitutionary. To further complicate things, the material and ideational dimensions are simultaneously involved in producing social stratification. In that sense, in my interviews “class” receives importance as a category of first order construction, i.e. it figures in my interviewees’ everyday construction of meaning. Research is, in my opinion, well advised to be aware of those two dimensions and their complex interplay.

The purpose of this article, to reconstruct the AS (as part of horizontal distinction), to locate it within vertical stratification, and to understand (material and ideational) processes of classification is very much in line with Bourdieu’s research agenda. Yet, in addition to choosing “milieu” as a concept, I also part with Bourdieu as far as the empirical access point to those phenomena is concerned. For my research, individual persons’ “narrative identity construction” in biographical interviews served as the observable empirical phenomena. While I used existing literature and available data to contextualize my results, the focus was clearly on communicative interaction and practices of discursive classification on the micro-level.12

The identity concept13 used here is located in the interactionist and social constructivist tradition. While the work of Mead, Goffman, and Berger were foundational for this thinking about identity, in my analysis, I drew most strongly on the concept of narrative identity put forward by Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann (“Narrative Identity;” Rekonstruktion). Identity is then considered, on the one hand, a flexible product of self-reflective individuals. Its construction is at the same time conditioned by power structures, by cultural frames of meaning, and by a person’s resources defined by her location in socio-cultural and historical context (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, Rekonstruktion 49-50).14 As such, it can be seen as “a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society” (Berger and Luckmann 195).15 Language is a medium central to interactive identity work, and narration constitutes a form of communication that has particular power for identity construction and meaning making (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, Rekonstruktion; Wenzler-Cremer 68-69). The presentation and enacting of narrative identity in a biographical interview is bound by the normative power of “social scripts and templates” (Baddeley and Singer 198) and narrative mechanisms. The resultant co-produced text provides

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an empirical access point to study individuals’ identity work, their attempts to come to term with the structural limits, and the concrete application of their resources in the specific socio-historical context. Positioning analysis has been one of the analytical tools for approaching the text. The resulting reconstruction of narrative identity enabled the teasing out of categories of difference that are employed by my interviewees in their struggles for distinction and is thus particularly apt to show discursive categorization at work.

The Background of This Article and Its Empirical Foundation

The upper middle class/upper class youth, had caught my attention long before the revolution. What I was primarily interested in, however, were neither issues of class nor issues of political change. At the outset of my research, I was interested in understanding how individuals cope with what I perceived to be contradictory macro-trends and corresponding practices in Egyptian society. These larger socioeconomic orientations can be circumscribed by the terms Westernization and Re-Islamization (or “turning West” and “turning East,” Werner). I consider both variants of globalization that shape the public sphere and people’s behavior and ideas in Egypt (Bayat; Werner). By analyzing people’s narrative identity construction I am able to gain some understanding of the relevance of those macro-trends for individuals. I assumed that students from AUC would be exposed to both trends to a high degree. AUC can be called “Egypt’s most liberal institution” (Bayat 147). Nonetheless, my own experience in Egypt and the observations of Bayat (147) and Mehrez indicated that both trends, Westernization and Re-Islamization, shape student life and interaction at this institution which is frequented by students from a variety of sociocultural backgrounds. In that sense AUC’s students are a “potpourri” (104), their socioeconomic location is more homogeneous: AUC takes on the formation of Egypt’s elite. In that respect, it originally competed with another secular institution of higher education, Cairo University. However, with the decline of the public educational sector as a consequence of the infitah (Ibrahim 106; Handoussa et al. 46), AUC’s importance has increased to such a degree that, today, Mehrez considers it “the [emphasis added] institution responsible for forming the affluent Egyptian elite, both male and female” (95). At the core of this formation are “a dual commitment to liberal arts and Arabic language and culture” (93). Being a “Western” institution “at the center of the elite education market” (95), AUC has become the target of both high hopes and severe suspicion. On the one hand, it provides its students with the cultural capital necessary for professional success in the Egyptian job market (Barsoum), presenting a near unique “window to the global future” (Mehrez 95). On the other hand, it is perceived as “a reposit[ory] […] of colonial influence and domination” (94). The contestation surrounding AUC is, therefore, not a simple reflection of major socioeconomic trends in Egyptian society, such as privatization and the decline of the public sector. It also touches upon the (discursive) struggles surrounding issues of nationalism, (neo-) colonialism, globalization and modernity. Peterson poignantly sums up this symbolic position of AUC:

[…] the American University in Cairo (AUC) represents to many Egyptians all the best and worst aspects of modernity. It is the pinnacle of academic excellence but also of elitism. It represents wealth and social mobility but also Westernization and loss of authenticity. (97)

The contradictions outlined here by Peterson clearly reflect on my interviewees’ identity construction. They are highlighted by the fact that my sample split into two halves as far as their trajectory into
AUC is concerned. While most of my twelve interviewees were accepted into some kind of financial reduction scheme by AUC, six of them had been awarded a full scholarship. The scholarship was based on merit, and is awarded annually to one person per governorate. The fact that they were "not from Cairo" (Samira) but from "a little bit conservative communit[ies]" (Mariam) was of central importance to those women's identity construction. In terms of their self-presentation, they formed a stark contrast to the other six women who could be considered part of AUC's classical elite clientele. The latter live with their families in traditional up-scale neighborhoods like Heliopolis, Mohandeseen, and Dokki or in gated communities in 6th of October City. They are dressed more or less casually, in a Western style, frequently refer to Western (pop) culture to describe their own preferences for cultural consumption, and have (comparatively) liberal norms as far as sexuality is concerned. It is them who identify with what one interviewee has called "my Americanized Society" (Yasmine). The scholarship recipients, on the other hand, stay in university dorms, they dress more conservatively, and adhere more strictly to conservative values. And even though they are far removed from their home communities, these constitute an important reference point in their autobiographical narrations, allowing them to construe themselves as mediators between two worlds. These differences notwithstanding, what unites a majority of my interviewees is their self-positioning as "upper-middle class" and their awareness of their society's stratified nature.

The Americanized Milieu: Living a "Completely Westernized" Lifestyle

"We are completely Westernized, and I mean, when I say we, me and my friends, because this is something collective ... we are completely Westernized. Completely Americanized, living in a very oriental society" (Rana).

Being part of the AS means pursuing a "Westernized" or "Americanized" lifestyle. A similarly central feature is the sharing of certain values and norms, in particular in reference to gender, sexuality, and convivial behavior. This focus on values indicates that the AS can be most appropriately described as a milieu, i.e. a social group who shares a lifestyle, norms and values, a certain outlook and way of interacting with the (social) environment, and that is distinguished by increased likelihood of interaction or communication. Being part of a milieu is usually also seen as depending on factors such as education and age.

For my interview partners, a defining part of being in the AS is to participate in certain activities. Together with their peers they spend their free time in venues that are linked to the imaginary of the West and that allow engagement in conspicuous consumption. These are places like the Western-style coffee shops such as Cilantro or Beano's; music clubs and bars like Cairo Jazz Club, that serve alcohol and usually play a mix of music from American and Egyptian pop to all kinds of electronic music; or the "hippie-style" beach camps between Taba and Nuweiba where consumption of legal and illegal drugs seems not to be unusual; the gigantic shopping malls such as City Stars presenting a huge variety of restaurants and shops; gyms and sports clubs with exclusive membership where there are Cross-fit and Yoga courses on offer; bowling alleys and multiplex cinemas. Besides frequenting those semi-public spaces (see below on exclusionary mechanisms), the Americanized also frequently meet at private houses—often without the supervision of parents or other relatives. Their consumption practices comprise material as much as (pop) cultural products, ranging from all sorts of music and music videos to TED
talks, American sitcoms, branded clothing and accessories, to Facebook and YouTube.

What most of those venues have in common is that the norms usually regulating gender and sexuality in the public sphere are suspended. Detailed analysis of my material showed that the norms my interviewees see themselves contrasted with in the more socially conservative Egyptian society can be clustered around three imperatives for women: chastity, dependence, marriage (Birkholz, “Identities” 196-202). Women need to protect their chastity, which starts with the reputation, being dependent on her outward appearance and her behavior. Both should be “decent” and “modest,” and avoid catching attention. For protection and provision the ideal Egyptian woman should rely on others (namely the men in the family, the boyfriend/fiancé or the husband). They should build their life around a striving for marriage and motherhood. While this might sound stereotypical, it represents the expectations my interview partners feel confronted with. In the AS, however, they feel free to dress as they like; wearing skirts, t-shirts, or spaghetti tops is not frowned upon. Also, interaction between men and women feels less regulated to them—in both a sexual and a non-sexual way. On the one hand, casual interaction between youth from the opposite gender represents a crucial feature of this milieu. Interaction between men and women has acquired a degree of normalcy that desexualizes certain practices. E.g. kissing a guy on the cheek or hugging him is claimed to be a normal form of a greeting between friends—without any sexual connotation attached to it. On the other hand, having a boyfriend is also perceived to be the norm rather than the exception. Similarly, the American “idea of dating” and the ideal of complementary partnership seem to be widely shared:

The whole Westernized thing. But that's because of me that's because I'm in that culture of Egypt, that society … where we're a bit influenced by the globalization part and so on. Where some of us accept the idea of dating and then we accept the idea of being exclusive. And then you take some time to go through the whole 'I'm gonna meet your parents' and then the whole steps that you see in … shows, American and other places, we're kind of accepting it more […]. (Nadia)

How far sexual contact goes largely depends on the individual but there seems to be a shared boundary which Nadia expresses most poignantly, and which my other interviewees individually confirm: “The whole physical part changes from one person to the other. [In] my society a lot of the people, the whole physical part, we do whatever we want but we don't have intercourse.”

Other practices that have become the norm in the AS but are perceived to be at odds with the more conservative segments of the Egyptian society are smoking and drinking (by both boys and girls). How much these practices have become the standard in the AS becomes most evident when Reem, an AUC student who in many regards shares the outlook and lifestyle of the AS, feels the need to distance herself from smoking and drinking which she perceives as the behavior peers at school and university would expect.

Furthermore, religion is treated as a private matter that falls squarely into the realm of private decision making. As a consequence, even for those who consider themselves devout Muslims, wearing a veil is not a preferred form of expressing their religiosity. In clear renunciation of what Bayat has termed “public piety,” they reject the idea that outward appearance provided a cue to religious identity, and affirm religiosity as an inward affair (Birk-
Furthermore, the Americanized’s outlook is shaped by supposedly Western values such as fun and freedom, appreciation for diversity, acceptance of difference and tolerance, open-mindedness, and a more independent position of young people.

While most of my interviewees construe themselves as tolerant and open to diversity, they feel pressure to conform to a supposedly homogenous society. They are under the impression of constant surveillance and tight social control by “the people” and their gaze that might detect any potential transgression of norms of morality and public order. In order to freely enact their norms and express their lifestyle according to their values, the Americanized need segregated places.

**Drawing the Material and Symbolic Boundaries of the Americanized Society**

Successful access to the aforementioned venues and products that ensure an Americanized lifestyle is dependent on both economic and cultural capital. Before describing those mechanisms, I want to draw attention to age as a factor that conditions membership in the AS. The aforementioned spaces and lifestyles are very much constituted by age in the sense that they are associated primarily with a certain age group that can roughly be defined as “youth.” While this is typical for a milieu, exclusion based on economic, cultural, and social capital applies to most kinds of stratification concepts. For Egypt, it is important to note that cultural capital, in particular the specific form “cosmopolitan capital,” is today also largely dependent on economic capital. The aforementioned decline of the public educational sector and its association with traditionalism, conservatism and a certain degree of xenophobia means that high-quality education satisfying global standards can only be obtained from private institutions. The private international schools and the international universities, like AUC and GUC (German University Cairo), equip their students with “familiarity with globally dominant, First World repertoires and standards” (De Koning 9) and “mastery of globally dominant cultural codes” (6). Besides being more or less internet-savvy, proficiency in English—in the best case spoken without an Egyptian accent—constitutes the central element of cosmopolitan capital and it is essential not only for access to upper (middle) class circles but also for success on the private and internationally oriented segments of the job market (De Koning 160; Haeri; Barsoum; Mehrez 103). While most Egyptian university graduates today speak some English or other foreign languages, the term “bilingual” has come to designate all those who have from an early age on been exposed to costly international education. Even though the term bilingual is not meant entirely literally, it points to the strong identification of the “bilinguals” with their second language and culture, and it helps to distinguish them from those who learned English at a public university. This renders understandable why Nadia, who on various occasions emphasizes her Westernization, highlights that being able to speak English without an Egyptian accent “totally affected my life.”

Beyond the boundaries drawn by cosmopolitan capital, the exclusion can be enforced through other means. Lifestyle and habitus are relevant when bouncers decide whom to grant access into Cairo’s nightclubs and bars. Restaurants introduce minimum charges to guarantee the economic capital of their customers, or even adopt the policy that after a certain time of day, when the evening business starts, women wearing a headscarf have to leave the venue. It is worth noting that those exclusionary practices are not limited to the Americanized milieu. The development of gated communities is generally seen as a means of the upper classes
to craft socioeconomically homogenous spaces (Abaza; Ghannam, “Promise”). For the AS, material and symbolic strategies of exclusion serve to protect the specific lifestyle and constitute the boundaries of the milieu in a vertical hierarchy, i.e. against those from a lower class. Their effective exclusion means that from the viewpoint of the Americanized no major, explicit conflicts arise between the classes. They note the constant need to adjust their behavior in reaction to this “dichotomy” of values, and complain about the inability to dress and behave everywhere in the same way they do in AUC, but beyond this annoyance, the difference does not cause any open friction as long as you know when and how to change repertoires:

And there are a lot of people who are like me. But you have to deal with the rest of the society ... at lots of points in time you know. People who don’t share the same ... way of thinking ... and these are the majority in the country, so you’re gonna have to deal with them at one point or the other ... so it’s good if you can. And I can. I mean I can deal with people who think in a way that is completely different than me and I would be fine with that. I would know what to avoid, what not to, so it’s fine. (Rana)

Yet, this lifestyle and the respective values distinguish the members of the AS also from people with similar socioeconomic background, often their parents or siblings. While they principally have access to the Americanized lifestyle in terms of capital volume and structure, they are not part of the milieu as far as their values (and in some cases their generation) are concerned. And while “the people’s” gaze creates an atmosphere of social control, it is family and peers who are not part of the AS who try to enforce more conservative norms. One reason for enforcing the triad of chastity, dependence and marriage, is to maintain the impression of a (upper) middle class identity and to avoid the pitfalls of elite identity. It is here exactly where class and gender intersect as forces structuring my interviewees’ lives. In order to underline this argument, let me show, why middle class identity seems attractive—and elite identity is not. This will also help to locate the milieu AS within the larger social space and understand the struggles of distinction and categorization.

The striving to be acknowledged as middle class is very similar to what Peterson describes as the struggle to strike “the right balance between authentic Egyptianness and Westernized modernity” (104). It is around the issue of (middle) class that the perceived opposition of modernity and tradition, Westernization and Egyptianness becomes articulated. The negative images held by some of my interviewees about “the rich” and “the elite” clearly illustrates this.
The scholarship holders draw quite an unfavorable picture of the “extremely rich” (Samira) when describing their own or their home communities’ perception. The rich are suspicious because of their rootless cosmopolitanism and their strong ties to barra, “the foreign/outside of Egypt.” The ambivalence vis-à-vis the elite seems to reflect society’s post-colonial sentiments and a strong ambivalence to foreign culture and power. On the one hand, “the richer you are, the more respected you are” (Mariam), while on the other hand, the rich are distrusted as their wealth is taken to indicate immorality. They are seen as non-religious, non-traditional, “they have no ethics” (Mariam) and eventually are not bound by the country’s legal and society’s ethical roles. Their immoral behavior in terms of sexuality is where their behavior supposedly overlaps with that of the poor. But while the poor have no other choice (“because when you are poor you can do anything to get food,” Eman), the rich act in that way simply because their status alone immunizes them so “they don’t have to go strict by our rules” (Eman).

You know, when you have the money, you do whatever you want. So no one would stop you and tell you ‘what the hell are you doing?’ Especially we were in a regime that if you crossed the road when you should not, and when you drive on a speed that you should not, if you have sometimes hit someone by the car and you are able to escape with it because you do have the money. So why wouldn’t you do something that’s outside of the traditions? (Eman)

Eventually, combining all these features, the “extremely rich” are portrayed as traitors, completely detached from Egyptian culture and the country’s woes (Mariam):

They are not Egyptians from our perspective. Not Egyptians not in nationality but in the culture, the life they never tasted, what it means not to be able to eat what they want to eat in a day. They never tasted what it means that the salary of your father is not exactly enough to complete the expenses of this month. They don’t know what even being near to poor is. (Eman)

Yet, as already indicated, this suspicion towards other classes runs both ways: Abaza has already observed the “obsession of the rich in Cairo […] to push away the unwanted poor as far as possible” (256). This coincides with the criminalization of poverty which constitutes a nearly global trend (Harders; Singerman and Amar; Wacquant, “Penalisation”). The informal settlements on the fringe of Cairo (ashwa’iyyat) are construed as “the Hobbesian locus of lawlessness, extremism, crime, and poverty” (Bayat and Denis 15). The poor are constructed as an uncivilized, unrefined counter-image to the elite.

Doing Middle Class Identity in Narrating Your Self

It is against this backdrop that (upper) middle class as a category for identity construction becomes attractive. While most of my interviewees use indexes associating them with middle class, the need to distinguish themselves explicitly from the “elite” seems pressing mostly for the AS.

The observed convergence of the upper classes notwithstanding, all of the regular AUC students and two of the scholarship holders clearly identify themselves as upper middle class. All my interview partners distinguish themselves from lower classes, by portraying themselves as modern, open-minded, and “cosmopolitan savvy” (De Koning 47). Theoretically, their educational capital has been asserted upfront as them being AUC students was a reason for my approaching them as interview partners. In addition, in doing an in-depth, biographical interview in English lan-
language, they were already performing as someone who belongs to the cultured classes. Nonetheless, my interviewees explicitly mentioned and highlighted their English language skills. Noor even emphasized that her former peers at Cairo University also “have the same level of English [as AUCians]—globalization is doing its job.” Most of those from communities other than Cairo also underline that they would not be able to go back because they could no longer deal with the “mentalities” and “close-mindedness” there, and because there were no adequate jobs available in other cities. At the same time, they frequently portray themselves as “mediators between local and global” (De Koning 47).

The regular AUC students make it a point that they are not the elite, and not elitist. They distinguish themselves from what they see as the upper class by various means. They emphasize that the upper class was disposing of still more economic capital: they “have private jets […] a car per person, those are upper class. They have […] villas in every shore area in Egypt for example. We’re not like that,” Reem states. She continues with a typical middle class categorization: “So I would say that we put all our money in education rather than in houses or cars and stuff.” While various interviewees concede that they “are living a luxurious life” (Naima), they stress that they “are not millionaires” (Naima) and “we can afford traveling a lot and all that but at the same time it’s not like we drive a Porsche. So we’re not one of these people. We only have one car that my mum and me share. It’s not too lavish of a lifestyle” (Lamis).

They also make it a point to distinguish themselves in terms of attitude. They are not part of “the rich kids that don’t care” (Rana). Rather, they are very much engaged, also in various civil society activities that are meant to enhance one’s own learning experience and contribute to society.26 They portray themselves as eager to learn, as people who value education, and who are thankful for the privileges they enjoy. Other than those AUC generations who have only known the new desert campus, they have not spent their entire life in a “bubble” (Yasmine; Lamis). They are not “elitist” (Lamis), they do frequent sha’bi (“popular”)27 venues and they respect people from different economic backgrounds. In terms of culture, and lifestyle, they are well-versed also in traditional and local repertoires (however constructed tradition and locality might be).

While the young women seem to have a stake in not being associated with the elite, their values and practices (as described above) clearly set them apart from those outside of the AS. Their wish to distance themselves from the elite, however, does not go so far to compromise those values. Their parents, brothers, and potential husbands seem to care a lot about the implications of being associated with the upper class. Yasmine’s mother, for example, tries to enforce strict traditional gender and family norms in an attempt to save her daughter from the moral corruption of Americanization and to reassert the importance of tradition and authenticity. While there might be other explanations, a detailed reconstruction of Yasmine’s narrative identity construction plausibly shows that one motive for her mother’s behavior is class-related (see Birkholz, “Identities”). Given that the family belongs to the particularly despised nouveaux riches, the mother’s focus on authenticity, tradition, morality, and rejection of anything “American” can be understood as enacting the own middle class-belonging in face of ongoing class competition (Willems 105). The fear of downward mobility and not being accepted by the traditional families might increase the need to distinguish one’s own family from the rootless, uncultured
nouveaux riches who are perceived as the “embodiment” of “possessive individualism” (Bayat 159-61). For projecting the image of a cultured middle class, women and their reputation are endowed with particular symbolic importance. This shows the entanglement of class and gender (re) production with discourses about the nation and modernity. The roots of women’s specific position in these reach at least as far back as the 19th century: the early struggles for an “indigenous definition of modernity […] took shape around the woman question” (Booth xxviii). The fear that “a superficial sort of Westernization […] was ruining Egyptian womanhood—and threatening the identity and survival of the nation” (xxviii) has a long-standing tradition in Egypt and makes itself felt in the struggles for class positions until today.

Reflections on Concepts of Social Stratification in Light of the Empirical Material

This article has attempted to reconstruct the AS as it figured in my interview partners’ narrative identity construction. It also showed that it is possible to understand this social collectivity conceptually as a milieu whose boundaries are drawn by lifestyles and various material and symbolic exclusionary mechanisms. Furthermore, it has tried to shed light on the politics of classifying oneself as middle class in Egypt, and on the way discursive (self-) categorization attempts to produce affiliation with this class and distinction from the elite. As such, this article is also an appeal for paying close attention to various theoretical and empirical intersections.

On a theoretical and conceptual level, it indicates that concepts focusing on the horizontal or the vertical level of social stratification need not be mutually exclusive. The AS milieu is clearly relevant to understanding the interviewees’ position in society. At the same time, class—and the struggles of distinction revolving around class-belonging—is also an important element of people’s narrative identity construction. In addition, those vertical dynamics are also relevant in locating the AS milieu within overlapping lines of distinction and for understanding its exclusionary practices. Rather than treating class and milieu as alternative concepts, it’s advisable to treat them as complementary. This is particularly true for societies like Egypt where individualizing tendencies exist alongside strong collective identification and economic division.

Furthermore, the analysis has shown that in order to understand struggles of distinction both first and second order constructs—in our case categories of daily practice and scientific categories referring to class—need to be taken into account. In the study of social stratification, the reconciliation of objectivist and subjectivist, i.e. realist and nominalist, concepts that Wacquant (“Symbolic” 4) took to be realized in Bourdieu’s work, is needed to understand the complex interplay of processes of meaning-making, discourses and material realities.

Finally, the analysis has also highlighted the need for truly intersectional studies that do not focus almost exclusively on one factor (class) while only cursorily touching upon the others (gender, age, region). The narrative identity construction of these young women has shown not only that gender, age, and class overlap in their positioning but that they all relate in different ways to larger discourses about modernity and Egyptianness. A desideratum for future research is thus not only to provide a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing those complex interrelations (Winker and Degele as well as L. Weber offer a starting point) but also to understand the implications for political processes and for ongoing conflicts about Egypt’s national identity.

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While being empirically very rich, providing invaluable insights to Egyptian society, many of the anthropological studies do not offer a thorough discussion of class as theoretical concept.

Today, class theories are considered as only one type of theory in the larger field of studies on social stratification (e.g. Grusky) or social inequality, as the German terminology has it (e.g. Burzan).

Weber does consider an individual’s skills and economic resources. Both, however, matter only in so far as they have a value on the (job) market.

This is not to say that Weber was the only, or singularly important, influence on Bourdieu. For further elaborations on Bourdieu’s theoretical and conceptual sources see Wacquant.

I am employing the translation that Wacquant usually uses in his writings on Bourdieu.

In this article, “discursive” refers to verbal expressions while indicating the constitutive power of discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 54). See also p. 4 on the discursive production of groups.

In Bourdieu’s own writing, the focus afterward clearly shifts to gender as a central category, and according to Wacquant (“Symbolic” 9) also to ethnicity, disguised as the occupation with “region, immigration, and the treatment of foreigners,” influencing people’s life chances.

Note that within our framework all of these—class, gender, age, region, race etc.—can be understood as sociostructural categories objectively positioning individuals in a constructed social space, and as discursive classificatory principles. This is equivalent to the distinction made by Winker and Degele between gender as a structural category and as a process (they add, however a third dimension of reading gender, which is the ideological level). Consequentially, Wacquant understands Bourdieu’s approach to class as a reconciliation of objectivist and subjectivist, realist and nominalist conceptions of class (“Symbolic” 4).

This corresponds with one element of the research agenda on intersectionality laid out by Winker and Degele: “Im Fokus stehen erstens Prozesse des Klassifizierens (und nicht ihre Ergebnisse) und zweitens Interaktionen auf der Mikroebene (und keine gesellschaftlichen Strukturen auf der Makroebene). Dabei ist Geschlecht neben u.a. Rasse, Nation, Religion, Beruf eine Kategorie, über die sich Menschen definieren, an der sie ihre Identität, verstanden als Verhältnis zu sich selbst, festmachen.” (19-20)

For a more detailed discussion of identity and narration see Birkholz, “Identities” 75-86.

To this extent, Bottero’s criticism that recent approaches to identity were focusing too much on the discursive nature of identity, thereby treating identity as “relatively independent of social position,” (5) does not hold true for the identity concept put forward here.
15 As such, it is close to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Liebsch). Nonetheless, in contrast to some scholars I consider it insufficient to reconstruct the habitus primarily on the basis of interview material. The habitus cannot be separated from the idea of embodiment. In my understanding, Bourdieu constructs habitus as a theoretical concept constituting the link between the observable lifestyle and the individual’s class location. For the debate on the empirical applicability of habitus see Bottero; Davey; Reay.

16 My usage of terms such as “self-positioning” or “to position” is influenced by positioning analysis as a tool to analyze text. See Birkholz, “Identities” 79-83 for the underlying understanding of “positioning.”

17 The choice to interview women only was due entirely to practical considerations. From my previous experiences in Egypt I had concluded that for me the kind of interview conversation I was hoping for would not have been possible with a considerable number of young Egyptian men.

18 For a definition of globalization and the differentiation from Westernization see Appadurai; Saalmann, Schirmer and Kessler; Spiegel. Westernization is for example evident in the “intensified transnational communication in form of Western products and the corresponding narratives and imagery streaming into Egypt” (Werner 7; see also Peterson 103). It is also visible in people’s consumption practices and leisure activities (Bayat 165).

19 This seems to be the case in particular for undergraduate students. Conversations with students and professors from AUC indicate that the socioeconomic background of the graduate students is different in so far as they mostly stem from a more modest economic background.

20 After the selective sampling (Rosenthal 86-87) I used the snowballing technique to find my interview partners, and relied on previous contacts as gatekeeper.

21 According to my interviewees, a reduction of tuition fees can be based on need, on merit, or on the parent’s status as AUC employee.

22 The choice of neighborhood is not exclusively economic. A family’s tradition and attachment can also play a role in the decision to stay in neighborhoods like Dokki, Manial, or Mohandeseen. For lower classes, Ghannam demonstrates the importance of attachment and of the fear to loose one’s identity by moving elsewhere (Remaking 78-79). It is interesting to note that none of my interviewees’ families had yet moved to the more recently constructed gated communities like “Beverly Hills City, Dreamland, Gardenia Park, Katameya Heights, and Hyde Park” whose English-language advertising openly appeals to those who aspire to a “Western” lifestyle (“The Promise”).

23 As there is no agreement as to how lifestyle and milieu shall be defined and delineated from each other, I decided to craft my own definition by combining the definitions put forward by Burzan; Hradil; Rössel; Schulze; and SIGMA.

24 See Birkholz, “Confronting” for a discussion of the concept “youth.”

25 The following paragraph on cosmopolitan capital and education draws equally on Barsoum; De Koning; Haeri; Mehrez.

26 For charity as a marker of middle class identity see De Koning 47; Rehbein 182.

27 The adjective derives from the word el-sha’b for “the people.” The English translation “popular” is not able to convey the negative connotation that sha’bi often has in Egypt. “Proletarian” might be a more adequate translation.
Cited Works


Southeast Asian Modernities.


Time Magazine Cover on February 28th, 2011, headline over a photo of Egyptian upper middle class youth.


