Being labelled and framed as a remote periphery of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is transforming since 2003 into a center attracting investments worth billions of dollars. Investigating this transformation, I scrutinize one of the visible outcomes of the investments, namely shopping malls, as examples and symbols of “modernity” and “progress.” The recently built shopping malls are thereby analyzed as the built materialization and symbols of neoliberal transformation and socio-economic change. Engaging with representatives of shopping malls as well as with the experiences of young female shopping-mall-goers, it will be illustrated how modernity and progress is framed within the Kurdish nationalist narrative and how this is taken up by young Kurdish female mall-goers. Thus, it will be contended that a historical narrative of past sufferings comes to legitimize the new liberal “freedoms” that are available through the full connection to and participation of Iraqi Kurdistan in the capitalist economic world system.

Keywords: Periphery; Neoliberalism; Iraqi Kurdistan; Gender Relations; Space; Shopping Malls

Since the fall of the Iraqi Ba’th regime in 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan has witnessed an economic boom. Obvious manifestations of this neoliberal transformation are apparent in the rapid changes of the urban landscapes of Kurdish cities like Dohuk, Sulaimaniya and especially Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region: shopping malls, gated communities, newly built luxury hotels, and “Western-style” bars and cafés have come to dominate the urban landscape. While metropolitan central spaces are thus emerging, this has to be understood in the historical context of Iraqi Kurdistan, which was until recently framed as a remote and peripheral region within Iraq (e.g. Natali; Stansfield). Studies that have specifically addressed peripheralization processes in Iraqi Kurdistan are rare, but Andrea Fischer-Tahir and Arian Mahzouni have engaged with peripheralization on a local level. Mahzouni analyzes the effects and causes of the widening gap between the “urban core” and the “rural periphery” in Iraqi Kurdistan while Fischer-Tahir highlights the different ways that the district of Qaradagh has become dependent on Sulaimaniya and thus has been produced as the periphery of the latter.

In this paper, I will focus on a global scale, outlining the transformation of Iraqi Kurdistan from a remote periphery into a...
center attracting US$39 billion of investment (RUDAW), mostly apparent in the construction sector and the production of spaces of affluence and exclusivity. Thus, I will specifically scrutinize shopping malls as symbols and the built materialization of “modernity” and exclusivity that embody the merging of a neoliberal ideology of success with a Kurdish nationalist narrative.

I will take on an ethnographic perspective on shopping malls in order to understand the transformations taking place in people’s everyday life, and will specifically address the following questions: How do representatives of shopping malls in Kurdistan refer to shopping malls? How are these newly emerging places incorporated into people’s everyday life, and what meaning do malls acquire in the lives of especially female Iraqi Kurdish mall-goers? How are shopping malls “produced” in a Lefebvrian sense and what do they symbolize in the context of Iraqi Kurdistan?

Focusing on these questions, I undertook four months of intensive ethnographic field research, from March to June 2014, which was the basis for my master thesis, titled “Subjectivity and Space: Shopping Malls in Iraqi Kurdistan.” I conducted interviews with representatives of shopping malls—mainly representatives of Mazi Mall in Dohuk and Majidi Mall in Erbil—and I also interviewed Iraqi Kurdish female mall-goers. For most of the intimate information, I relied on my female family members in Dohuk. In addition, I engaged in participant observations and informal conversations with mall-goers and shopping mall representatives while also incorporating everyday life conversations into this study. Having adapted an ethnographic methodology in order to capture people’s everyday life, it is philosopher Henri Lefebvre who emphasized the importance of the subject and the everyday life to understand the production of space in its entirety. It is thus his theoretical insight that will underpin this analysis of the production of malls in Iraqi Kurdistan.

A Lefebvrian Approach

Engaging with the aforementioned questions during my research, I understand the production of shopping malls in Iraqi Kurdistan to be founded on the production of peripheries. These peripheries might be geographically locatable in the rural areas of Kurdistan, or Nepal and Bangladesh, where most of the cheap labor in Iraqi Kurdistan comes from. Peripheries are also produced within certain parts of the city of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniya, or even in a disguised form in the shopping malls themselves, such as through the presence of foreign cheap labor in the mall, for example. As has been pointed out by Fischer-Tahir and Naumann, the construction of centers and peripheries results from the same process of an uneven capitalist investment policy that favors certain spaces over others: “Peripheralization refers to a spatially organized inequality of power relations and access to material and symbolic goods that constructs and perpetuates the precedence of the centers over areas that are marginalized” (14).

Understanding peripheralization as part of the production of social injustice that is produced through economic, social and discursive transformations, the three-dimensional theory of Lefebvre will serve as a fruitful concept to grasp and analyze the production of shopping malls. Lefebvre’s idea of space is based on a triad of moments in which space is (re-)produced. While keeping in mind that it is an analytical division rather than a division mirrored by social reality, I will focus on the analysis of the production of lived and conceived space of malls. To conceive or think about space requires the production of knowledge on a certain space and thus, the production of space itself. Conceived space therefore is part of what Foucault defined as discourses and what Lefebvre calls the “dominant space in any...
The representations of space, e.g. *conceived* space, are tied to the relations of production (33) and the knowledge that is thereby reproduced. Drawing on Gramsci’s term of hegemony, Lefebvre clearly states the existing “connection between knowledge (savoir) and power” (10). Framing *conceived* space as the dominant space of representation, Lefebvre implies that lived space might be a counter space, as it is the “subject,” the individual, the ordinary “user” of space and his/her experiences that are at the heart of any analysis. Lived space then is 

... space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ ... This is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. (39)

However, keeping in mind the three-dimensionality of Lefebvre’s idea, one needs to be cautious not to overemphasize an antagonistic relation of “dominant” and “dominated” space. The material production of space, namely *perceived* space (38) is the third moment of the production of space that renders a possible antagonism obsolete. Addressing *lived* space, it is more fruitful to take a closer look at the way “users” render this space into a “lived” space through “making symbolic use of its objects” (39). So, it is the meaning-making processes of ordinary “users” that will be the focus of the analysis of *lived* space.

As much as Lefebvre notes every society’s distinct mode of production (31), he accordingly stresses the “historical period” (27) for the analysis of the production of space. Thereby, he highlights the importance of each society’s specificities and distinctness with regard to socio-economic and historical characteristics. Accordingly, I will present the recent socio-economic history of Iraqi Kurdistan.

**Socio-Economic Transformations in Iraqi Kurdistan**

It is widely acknowledged in academia that the US-led intervention in 2003 brought a series of neoliberal policies to Iraq that was implemented through the Coalition Provisional Authority led by Paul Bremer (Tripp; Dodge). These policies “... seemed to be opening up Iraq to a free-for-all of economic opportunity, in which Iraqis themselves could only play a minor role” (Tripp 289-90).

Central developments before 1991 cannot be discussed at appropriate length here; however, the years of war, especially, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the targeted aggressions of the central Iraqi government that deprived Iraqi Kurds of their livelihood need to be noted as crucial developments that have had long-term effects for today’s politics (Yildiz 68). One of the most gruesome acts of violence committed by the former Iraqi regime was the Anfal campaign in 1988 that culminated in the chemical gas attacks on Halabja (Mlodoch 64). Anfal is to the present day inscribed into the Kurdish narrative of past sufferings and thereby also instrumentalized by various Kurdish parties for different Kurdish nationalist purposes (Watts, “Role of Symbolic Capital” 73).

In 1991, a no-fly zone was established that ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Iraqi Kurdistan. Following this, a UN economic embargo was implemented which paved the way for the start of a humanitarian aid regime, including international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that met the basic needs of the local population. In addition to the
general UN sanction regime against Iraq, Saddam Hussein imposed an internal embargo on the Northern Kurdish provinces, which meant that in the “relief phase” financial resources were scarce and the control of these resources became ever more contested. One of the most lucrative businesses was the trade in petrol products at the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing in Zakho. Leezenberg notes how “… the petrol trade was increasingly ‘privatized’: in a sense it replaced the state supplies of oil to the north, at far greater cost to the local population” (“Iraqi Kurdistan” 638). Furthermore, these economic developments and lack of resources were also a crucial factor contributing to the next war, namely the civil war between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) from 1994 until 1998 (638). Among the reasons for the end of the militia war was the Oil-for-Food programme (OFFP) implemented in 1997. Thirteen percent of the revenues were set to be sent to the Kurdish region. Although this marked an important point of change towards better living conditions, the sanctions regime was still ongoing and an aid regime continued that undermined a self-sufficient economy (639-40). The start of the OFFP thus marked a shift towards a broader reconstruction effort of Iraqi Kurdistan.

However, this remained “within a neoliberal framework” where “entrepreneurial classes” emerged and a “more diversified workforce” (Natali 148) developed. Consequently, at the end of the OFFP came the gradual neoliberalization of Iraqi Kurdistan: for the Iraqi state and specifically for Iraqi Kurdistan, the political parties were divorced from their responsibility to provide for society. The basic provision of society was rather done by an established humanitarian aid regime. On a political level the aid regime also contributed to the emergence of a Kurdish region more and more separate from Iraq. Gradual support of the Kurdish region and the idea of a Kurdish nation through an international Western aid regime was an emerging trend at this point, and this development was further carried on through different business players and Western campaigns in 2003.

**After 2003: “Kurdistan Is Open for Business”**

With the US-led invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan could declare its own autonomous status, thereby also enhancing its own “international legitimacy and internal sovereignty” (Natali xxvi). This was further institutionalized in the Iraqi constitution, lending greater recognition to the Kurdish region. In 2006, the PUK and KDP also decided to formally merge into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This alliance enabled them to “share the spoils of lucrative construction, business, and petrol-related contracts” (Watts, “Democracy” 146). This arrangement was further institutionalized after 2003 when the KRG had enough international recognition to actively pursue a policy where attracting foreign direct investment became a top priority. Denise Natali frames this policy as a “developmental strategy [that] focuses on private sector growth” and is “underpinned by Kurdish nationalist priorities” (86). It is important to note from these developments that the changing economic conditions not only led to the emergence of a Kurdish quasi-state, but also transformed Kurdish nationalism, a development that will be discussed further in this work. Feeding into the Western view of an undemocratic authoritarian Middle East, Kurdish nationalist elites redefined “democraticness” as a key feature of Kurdish identity, as pointed out by Nicole Watts: “The ‘democratic-ness’ of Kurds has been one of many factors used to juxtapose Kurds and Kurdish identity against Arabs, in particular” (“Democracy” 148).
“We Love Kurdistan and That Is Why … It Is Secure”: Transforming Kurdish Nationalism to Build Malls

In late April, 2014, HEWA Group had a stand promoting new housing opportunities to Majidi Mall visitors close to the entrance. As I approached the stand with a male German friend, we were greeted in English. After asking in Kurdish what this stand was about, the employee continued in English. After talking about what HEWA Group, the owners of Majidi Mall, were promoting, we expressed our astonishment at this fast development of construction:

Me: Wow, this is a really fast construction process.

HEWA Group representative: Yes. Kurdistan is developing very fast. People say it is becoming the new Dubai. And I would say we would be even better than Dubai. I mean the people of Dubai are also very ambitious and they did a lot for their country and built a lot. But you know the weather over there is not that good...you cannot walk outside. But Kurdistan also has beautiful nature...so we have a lot and we are building all this. So we are proud of our development and Kurdistan is secure.

Friend: Why do you think that Kurdistan is so secure?

HEWA Group representative: Well, because we love Kurdistan and that is why. The middle and south of Iraq is not so secure but here it is secure and that is the most important thing: security. Let me give you this leaflet. It has some more information on it and you can also visit our website.

This short encounter with a representative of HEWA Group captures and illustrates many of the complex levels of the ways in which malls and also housing opportunities are represented within the Kurdish discourse. As will be further shown, “development” in this encounter is equated to impressive construction projects like malls, amusement parks and gated communities. At the same time, as illustrated in the above conversation, this is merged with a local sentiment of Kurdish nationalism: the newly built construction projects embody the Kurdish capability for “modern progress” not only to the Kurds but, maybe more importantly, to potential Western investors. One of the most apparent aspects of this was the fact that the representative of HEWA Group led the whole conversation in very good English.

While this specific role of the English language is also clear in other contexts, it is obvious that speaking English in the mall is naturalized, thereby creating it as an international space where Western or non-Kurdish customers will be comfortable directly speaking English. During my observations, this atmosphere differed drastically from what I experienced in the bazaar, where Kurdish is the first language spoken and where people only rarely speak English.

In this conversation, the HEWA Group representative linked economic boom and architectural development to Kurdish nationalism. According to him, “Kurdistan is so successful and is not subjected to the violence in the rest of Iraq because Kurds are good patriots who love their country.” What remains unsaid but implicit in his message is that the rest of Iraq is insecure because of Arabs’ lack of love for their country and their incapability of being modern people embracing success.

This is an important aspect of the re-making and transforming of Kurdish nationalism that is linked to the investments of foreign companies in Iraq. In Lefebvrian terms, this neoliberal Kurdish nationalism is the broader discursive context enabling the conceived production of the mall. The gradual transformation of a Kurdish nationalist discourse that has been indicated by Denise Natali and...
Nicole Watts and brought forward earlier in this text is increasingly entangled with the concrete business interests of foreign elites. Aiming at investments from mostly Western European and American companies, the regional Kurdish elite is in need of presenting itself as the modern and secular force of the Middle East. The change in self-presentation of Kurdish leaders is thus fuelled by Western business and entrepreneurial elites. The Other Iraq campaign is illustrative of convincing Western companies of the "modern Kurdish working environment" that stands in contrast to the ways in which Iraq is portrayed as a country of chaos and violence in the media. The "othering" of Arabs might be found in classical Kurdish nationalist discourses before 2003, yet the ways in which this is now linked to Western business interests is an emerging tendency. Magazines such as the Kurdistan Investment Guide, an official publication by the Kurdistan Regional Government in collaboration with Western scientists and business partners, is exemplary for promotions that display the ways that business interests are merged with Kurdish nationalist sentiments. One example being a Forbes & Manhattan advertisement in the Kurdistan Investment Guide 70 (2011), that portrays a child's face painted over in a Kurdish flag and is subtitled: "PROUD TO INVEST IN THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN."

As important as Western European and American companies and business partners are, more immediate and regional models of success that Kurdish people relate to are countries such as the UAE and Turkey. This is illustrated by the following tour that I took in Mazi Mall in Dohuk with Niaz on April 16, 2014. Niaz, who introduced herself as a representative for the mall, explained to me the important function of the mall in Kurdish:

Me: So could you tell me something about the building of this mall?
Niaz: So this mall is very new and was just opened a few weeks ago. We also did not open everything. The owner is Haji Meshhud. He also built Dream City and the Mazi Supermarket in Dohuk. So this is all part of his project. In this mall we have only international brands. We opened this mall for them. Our contracts are only 4-5 years long and we do not have much to do with the shops. Only, with some of the shops, like for example Swiss Watch [while we are walking by that shop], we have contracts in which they grant us 10 percent of their profits.

Before I met Niaz, I had heard the name Haji Meshhud from my family. They informed me that Haji Meshhud is well-known in Dohuk. He was once, probably in the period of the 1990s, a rather poor street vendor, but made a quick career within the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Asking how they knew this, they said that this is common knowledge in Dohuk. He is supposed to be among the KDP elite, with good contacts to the Turkish business elite. Niaz did not talk much about what or who Haji Meshhud is but referred quite naturally to the fact that Haji Meshhud is “the owner” of Mazi Mall and “built Dream City and Mazi Supermarket” in Dohuk. Niaz did not actually “build” the mall but rather planned and managed the construction process of these malls became quite clear. However, the workers who actually built these malls remain unmentioned and thus out of people’s consciousness.

Describing the mall as an international and modern space is framed through a security discourse: expensive international products not only need the modern space of the mall but also specific security concepts. Thus, the security staff in the mall is legitimized as a way to safeguard expensive Western products, thereby contributing to a safe and harmonious environment, as Niaz explains:

Me: Isn’t Kurdistan safe enough? Why do you need security within the mall?
Niaz: Yes of course it is. But with these
international brands or stores selling gold [walking by a shop that sells gold], there needs to be a special security staff for the sake of safety. This is done by a Turkish company. Irrespective of the “logic and correctness” of her argumentation, a comparison with a different Kurdish shopping context, namely the bazaar, that has no private security even though expensive goods such as gold are sold, illuminates the ways in which the consumption of international goods is linked to a “modern” shopping experience. Suffice it to conclude here that the need for shopping malls to sell international products contributes to the production of the shopping experience as a profoundly modern, Western and exceptional experience. This experience cannot be obtained in the narrow alleys of the bazaar, and the bazaar is incorporated rather differently into the neoliberal project of modernizing Iraqi Kurdistan: namely as the authentic place of Kurdish culture.

It is not only the exclusive high quality products from expensive Western brands on offer that quite obviously contribute to the malls’ image as Western, modern places. It is also the explicit intentions and vision of the architects and mall planners to promote the mall as a space that is planned and designed according to foreign ideas:

Niaz: A Turkish architect designed the mall according to foreign standards. As you can see, on the ground floor we also have a space for exhibitions. So artists can also exhibit their products. Emphasizing the presence of foreign designers and international brands in the mall, Niaz is also explicit about her idea of the mall as a positive step forward and ultimately as the space of modernity:

Me: Do you think that the mall could be a danger to the bazaar? That in the end, we will not have bazaars anymore?

Niaz: No, I don’t think so. We need more of these malls and modern new centers to move forward. In the past, I always had to go to Erbil for shopping. And now I am here. Dohuk has its own mall. We actually had a lot of people who asked us when the mall will be finally opened. I was personally asked so many times. People need this. If they want to take a break, they come here. At nights, this mall is full of people. The way in which Niaz sees the mall as a new opportunity for people to enjoy, amuse themselves or take a break from their everyday lives is quite characteristic of the broader way that the mall management conceives of the mall and presents it as a space of modernity and symbol of progress. This conception of the malls is an important part of producing the mall in its entirety in the context of Iraqi Kurdistan. It has become clear how notions of “progress,” “development” and “modernity” become enmeshed with Kurdish nationalist identities on a conceptual level. Following up on this, it is crucial to investigate how these notions are taken up and lived through performances and practices within the mall.

Inside the Mall
Delving into the lived production of the mall, in the following I will describe a scene of family members and myself inside Mazi Mall in Dohuk:

Once inside the mall, my friends decided to take a walk. This meant that we started from the entrance and went from shop to shop, walking into the shops that were appealing to my friends. Appealing could mean that the prices were thought to be acceptable or because they had “great clothes.” Getting started was different from the bazaar. In practice, trips to the bazaar would be much more target-oriented. Nesrin and Perwin knew what they needed and they told their mother in advance. And at the bazaar, we would go directly to shops that we knew rather than starting a random walk-around. Also, in discussion
and talks, I was told that for the bazaar it is better to take someone who knows his/her way around. And so, the purpose of the mall was rather to walk around. Choosing the mall as a space “to go out,” the intention of enjoying oneself was further demonstrated by another factor: taking photos. Nearly everywhere in the mall, we would take photos of ourselves, in front of shops or within the shops. This was not uncommon among the other shopping mall visitors. Taking photos in Kurdistan as well as in other places happened to mark a special event. It meant to deem an action, thing or place worth enough to make a picture in order to hold on to that moment. Being dressed-up and/or on a trip to nature with family/friends, school or university ceremonies, weddings, etc. were usually moments that were worth taking a picture. However, it did not occur in the everyday life while wearing pyjamas or when going to the bazaar. Taking photos at the mall made the shopping mall experience very exclusive. It produced the mall as a valuable, special place to be. It was an event that had to be remembered. On another level, taking photos of oneself within the mall was part of the performance of a modern Self. In this sense, the production of the mall and people’s Selves as modern and upper-class is part of a reciprocal relationship. Similar to the way in which Kurdishness had been conceived earlier as comprising “progressiveness” and economic success (symbolized through the ability to build imposing architecture), this is how a new Kurdish Self is actually lived in and through the mall, thereby producing the mall as a modern space.

We entered a shoe shop at the mall where Nesrin saw a pair of shoes she very much liked. She tried them on and expressed her admiration and love for the shoes. Her friends gathered around her while she was wearing the shoes and looking at them from the mirror. Everyone, me included, expressed that the shoes did indeed fit her. However, no one suggested that she should buy the shoes. Instead, her cousin told her that she should not leave any of her wishes unfulfilled (lit. do not leave anything inside your heart). “You try them and make a photo of yourself. You can look at it all the time.” The girls did not buy the clothes but rather tried them on to make photos of themselves. This was repeated several times. In another shop, Nesrin and Perwin made photos of themselves with differently colored hats on.

This performance might indeed happen in other contexts and countries; however, the Kurdish historical context lends its specificity to the performances of young Kurdish female mall-goers. Having outlined the decades of war, sanctions and the discourse of the “historical Kurdish suffering,” this context needs to be taken into consideration. In the Kurdish context, within my observations and conversations, the fact that especially an older generation could not fulfil so many of their dreams and had lived a life of scarcity was also ingrained into younger generations’ narratives of the past. The insistence of Nesrin’s friend to not leave her wishes unfulfilled must be understood in this historical context. Thus, it is stated that today it is not necessary to suppress one’s wishes anymore, especially when being in a shopping mall. Consequently, it is a history of suffering and abundance that is partly legitimizing a new type of freedom that enables Iraqi Kurdistan, exemplified through its shopping malls and mall-goers, to present itself as part of the modern capitalist world system.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have outlined how shopping malls in Iraqi Kurdistan are designated as symbols of “modernity” and the drastic socio-economic change of the region. Not only geographically a peripheral region of the Iraqi state but also economically, socially and culturally produced as the periphery of Iraq, the Kurdistan
Region is developing into a center of investment to Iraq, if not the entire Middle East. Theoretically underpinned by Lefebvre’s concept of conceived space, it has been shown how malls are conceived as symbols of Kurdish success. “Kurds love Kurdistan,” as has been said by the HEWA Group representative, and thus Kurdistan is safe and deserves liberty and the joy of shopping malls. Consequently, they have “earned” their right to be part of the modern, capitalist world system much in contrast to the Arabs of Iraq. This neoliberal Kurdish nationalism then also feeds into the desires of young female mall-goers who produce the mall, in Lefebvrian terms, as a lived space when they present themselves as “modern” and as finally part of the Western world.

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Notes

1 For insight on ethnographic methodology, I follow Atkinson, Hammersley, Przyborski, and Wohlrab-Sahr.

2 Ronneberger explains that “… the declared goal of his intellectual project was, above all a ‘revalorization’ and the quest for spaces that allow for autonomy and creativity” (135).

3 Speech of former Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani at an international trade show in Sulaimaniya (qtd. in Natali 86).

4 HEWA Group Holding is a company in Iraqi Kurdistan that, among other projects, owns and manages Majidi Mall.

5 The talk was about 5-10 minutes long and was entirely in English despite my initial questions in Kurdish. I continued in English talking about the specific prices of the new houses and how to purchase a flat or house.

6 Interestingly, the homepage (hewa.com) is available only in English while the flyer that I received was in Arabic.

7 Of course there might be instances where shop owners at the bazaar speak English or German. There were, for example, some Kurds who returned from Germany and were able to speak German.

8 The campaign is visible on the website theotheriraq.com.

9 See also Fischer-Tahir and Dultz 10-12.

10 Niaz talked to me in Bahdini-Kurmanji Kurdish, the prevalent dialect in Dohuk. I translated this myself into English.

11 As I cannot refer in more detail to the bazaar, I have outlined parts of this process in “The Proud Neoliberalisation of Iraqi-Kurdistan.”

Works cited


Interviews
