This article studies representations of the Algerian population promoted by francophone intellectuals in a context of longstanding crisis and uncertainty. Borrowing the category of symbolic analysts from Robert Reich, it looks at the way in which novelists, scholars and journalists try to make sense of a critical situation by diagnosing the culture of the Algerian population as deviant or backward. Aiming to encourage social and political reform, these actors try to understand the characteristics of their “people,” often by pointing to their so-called pre-modern or passive behaviors. This article analyzes two aspects of this activity: first, attempts to determine who is responsible for the ongoing crisis, and second, the reproduction of cultural prejudices in a context of increased transnationalization. Moreover, it argues that one can interpret the political and intellectual commitments of these analysts by drawing on the triad concept of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming,” which has been used to study the publicization of disputes.

Keywords: Algeria; Culture; Crisis; Post-colonialism; Symbolic Analysts
ently backward. For Reich, symbolic analysts are those who identify problems and solve them by manipulating symbols. In Algeria, these actors are trying to solve the problem of a persistent political and social instability in the aftermath of the civil war (1992-1999). In order to do so, they manipulate notions such as “the people” or the “Algerian culture” to understand the causes of the crisis and propose their own solutions. In the following pages, we study two aspects of this activity: first, attempts to determine who is responsible for the ongoing crisis, and second, the reproduction of cultural prejudices in the postcolony given a context of increased transnationalization. Subsequently, we will see how this discursive activity can be understood through the prism of the process of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and Sarat), a triad concept that explains the production of public disputes.

As Guerroua’s case illustrates, the limits between the literary, academic and media fields can be especially blurry, since all of these fields are subsumed in the broader field of intellectual production. In this article, our main symbolic analysts are a novelist, an academic and a journalist. They have all reached a level of national and international recognition that allow them to intervene regularly in public discussions in Algeria and beyond. The article will be divided into four sections. The first part presents the context of the civil war that introduced the idea of a historical break and an increasing gap between secular intellectuals and the rest of the society. The award-winning author Rachid Boudjedra serves to illustrate this point. The second section focuses on the role of social scientists in the production of culturalist explanations for the absence of a democratic transition. Here, some of the writings of Lahouari Addi allow us to study the production of a diagnosis that insists on national political culture to explain the absence of democracy. The following part shows that a commitment in favor of political change also leads some analysts to call for a disciplinary project directed at the Algerian population in order to correct its backward behavior. To illustrate this point, the paper invokes recent articles from journalist Kamel Daoud, published after the Arab Spring. Finally, the last section looks at the consequences of the transnationalization of these figures, as their analyses are appropriated and instrumentalized outside of Algeria.

The 1990s as a Historical Break
To understand the production of diagnosis of the Algerian people by our symbolic analysts, one must start by looking at the historical context. Commentators have often described the gap between the utopian expectations that followed independence in 1962 and the realities of daily life, which was increasingly marked by pervasive hardship. After the end of French occupation, the revolutionary elites embodied the hope of colonized peoples beyond Algeria, as they were committed to fulfilling national independence, achieving economic prosperity and redefining the global balance of power (Carlier 311-16). During the rule of Houari Boumediène (1965-1978), an authoritarian developmental state was in charge of organizing the economy and planning the country’s evolution. Internationally, Algerian diplomacy was at its zenith, as its spokesmen advocated the forgiveness of Third-World debt and the nationalization of resources. Yet, disillusionments and woes soon followed this early period of hope and ambition. A drop in oil prices and the subsequent economic crisis fed the disenchchantment of workers and students, resulting in a succession of strikes and riots at end of the 1980s and an uprising in October 1988 (Chikhi, “Algérie”). The latter marked a clear break in regard to the dominant conceptions of historical progress espoused by intellectuals from revolutionary or reformist backgrounds. The following years saw the constant
degradation of the political situation and the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) as the main political party in the country. The interruption of the electoral process by the army in January 1992 exacerbated the tensions, and the country fell into a spiral of political violence, leading to the disaggregation of the national community. At the same time, Algeria faced a structural adjustment program, the dismantlement of public services and an economic liberalization that benefited crony capitalists (Brahimi El Mili).

This historical context allows us to better grasp the position of our social category. Once belonging to the elite, these actors were suddenly confronted with increased competition in the intellectual field (notably by Islamist figures), a growing precariousness resulting from structural adjustment, and Jihadi violence against secular figures. Some of them left the country because of the war. While they had been trained to become a vanguard leading the way to social and intellectual advancement, they were brutally confronted with the crisis experienced by the country during the 1980s-1990s (El Kenz). Consequently, the subsequent diagnoses concerning the culture of the Algerian people are a way of understanding this apparent historical failure, rather than a form of disdain for the masses.

During the civil war, Algeria witnessed the development of a descriptive literature that analyzes the mental state of the population and the supposed illnesses of the country (corruption, violence, fundamentalism). This tendency was highlighted by the rise of a new generation of authors, such as Yasmina Khadra and Boualem Sansal, who excelled in the genre of the crime novel—a kind of writing that is well-suited to describing psychological and cultural deviance. In their works published at the end of the 1990s, both of these writers described a society tortured by paranoia, intolerance, historical confusion and cynicism (Khadra; Sansal). While very different in style, both Khadra and Sansal were products of the developmental state’s elite schools in the 1970s; Khadra was trained in Cherchell’s military academy, and Sansal graduated from the Polytechnic School of Algiers. As such, they were confronted with the gap between official promises and the reality of crisis. While they described a pathological and morbid society, they also remembered a lost normalcy, thus laying a potential foundation on which to rebuild the polity (Naudillon).

When participating in public debates, our symbolic analysts assume their own responsibility as intellectuals and, at the same time, they search to attribute blame at the national level in terms of finding those whose moral and political failures have brought the country to crisis (Milstein). This investment in politics is especially evident for a novelist such as Rachid Boudjedra. A former nationalist militant during the war of independence, the novelist born in 1941 was ostracized by the regime for a few years in the 1960s before returning to Algeria. Writing both in French and in Arabic, he became a major figure in the national literary field and a close counselor of many ministers situated to the left of the ruling coalition. Yet, the victory of the FIS during the legislative elections of December 1991 endangered him both as an individual associated with the governing elite and as a secular intellectual. In 1992, a few months after the military coup, Boudjedra published a pamphlet entitled “FIS de la haine,” in which he moved away from his position as a novelist to offer a stylized but nonetheless virulent account of the country’s political situation. As a communist, Boudjedra had often criticized the conservatism of Algerian society. Yet, with the fall of the USSR and the rise of Islamism, he abandoned his prior investment in the dichotomy between progress and archaism for a new understanding that counterposed modernity to
archaism (Chikhi, “Islamisme”). This conceptual break implied a shift toward a more inquisitorial tone. In his pamphlet, he pointed to three kinds of responsibility in order to understand the Algerian crisis. First, he accused a neocolonial “francophrone” of erasing the diversity and singularity of Algerian culture and promoting the FIS on its satellite TVs (Boudjedra, 23-27). Second, he blamed a corrupted state for bringing a “culture of laziness and inertia” to the people (67). These politics made possible the rise of Algerian neo-fundamentalists, described by Boudjedra as a minority of mentally defective fascists whose political program was limited to violence and regression (16, 111). In other words, our symbolic analyst identified those who led a large part of the population to endorse what he understood as a backward politico-religious program.

Culture and Politics
The protean crisis experienced by Algeria from the 1980s onward stimulated the activity of the symbolic analysts, as they were also compelled to find new ways to speak of the community. In order to study the trajectory of the country after Boumédiène’s death in 1978, they sought to develop a new understanding of the world that would move away from Third-Worldist dogma. Their attempt to explain and reconceptualize the country’s situation brings us back to the first etymology of the notion of crisis, the Greek krisis which refers to a moment of judgment, of distinction, of construction of the criteria useful in order to allow a renewed understanding of the situation (Cristias 7). In other terms, the troubled period of the 1980s and 1990s fed the demand for a paradigm shift. At the end of the 1990s, a dominant conceptual toolkit was available for whoever wanted to think about political upheavals. The narrative of democratization based on the global expansion of an Anglo-Saxon liberal model was widely propagated during the period of the so-called “third wave.” In fact, in Algeria the period of extreme violence followed a political opening that partially matched this model. At the end of the Black Decade, some longstanding specialists of the region remained hopeful that the erosion of the authoritarian model could give birth to a genuine democratic transition (Quandt; Leveau). Yet, a few years later, the persisting influence of the military, the violent repression of the Kabyle uprising of 2001 and the struggles at the top of the state between the new president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his prime minister Ali Benflis demonstrated the inadequacy of this wishful thinking. Rather, Algerian scholars underlined the continuation of the “political, security and economic crisis” after the end of the civil war (Bennadji).

This “failed” transition, coupled with the memory of the civil war, led certain social scientists to develop an analysis blaming a “patriarchal culture,” which was unsuited to the rule of law and perpetuated “traditional segmental structures,” for the behavior of the ruling elite and the population (Remaoun). Slowly but surely, interpretations based on a form of cultural evolutionism began to flourish in the academic field. The example of Lahouari Addi is particularly interesting in this regard—precisely because of his intellectual commitment to anti-essentialist approaches. Primarily trained as a sociologist of rural societies, Addi later moved his field of interest to the political sphere, as he prepared his doctorat d’état in France at the École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales. Working notably on questions of populism and power in Algeria, he became a commentator on the country’s latest political events, and his informed opinion continues to regularly appear in Algerian newspapers.

Addi’s interest in anthropologists studying the Maghreb—such as Gellner and Geertz—allows him to reflect the refutation of essentialist analysis regarding the role of
Islam in contemporary Muslim society and to advocate for a socio-historical approach (Deux antrophologues). At the same time, he focuses on the development of an Algerian political culture, at the crossroads of traditional structures, the war of independence and French modernist influence. According to him, this culture produces specific representations of the state and explains the rise of the FIS as well as persisting populism and political violence. While refusing an approach that would disqualify a reified Islam or Arab culture, he develops an analysis based on various myths associated with liberal democracy (sovereignty of the voters, openness of electoral competition, empty space of power). Conversely, he opposes this ideal system based on representation and rule of law to a disorganized Algerian society prone to rioting where political power is privatized and cannot fully emancipate itself from a medieval form of religious control (“Les partis politiques”). Addi is certainly not the only political analyst to take for granted this mythology of the “good democratic system.” Nevertheless, what is especially telling is that his refutation of essential difference leads to an analysis based on cultural evolutionism: “State power in Algeria is vacant because there are no ideological mechanisms to return it to its owner: society. This is the reason for the failure of the regime, which is not because of the wrong model or the wrong-headed implementation of a more or less coherent economic policy [emphasis added]. It is about political representations where the individual, as a subject of law, does not exist, and where the group is sublimated by a discourse of the leader, who enjoys an external authority. This is like the old traditional political order that negates the political and considers the leader as a man who rights the wrong rather than someone who protects individual freedom. We must overcome a culture based on justice and replace it with a culture based on freedom [emphasis added].” (L’Algérie d’hier 74-75)

This excerpt illustrates a change in the diagnosis proposed by symbolic analysts. While Boudjedra focused on the external and internal actors responsible for the backwardness of the population, Addi suggests that cultural reform is necessary in order to solve the country’s issues and encourage a transition towards modern political behavior. Yet, there is a distinction to be made between academics and other analysts, thus introducing a nuance in our meta-category. While Addi’s writings are too careful to employ orientalist clichés, many of his contemporaries are less cautious. Thus, observers in the daily press often propose anthropological readings of politics in Bouteflika’s Algeria that point to “local mentalities” and their so-called pathological consequences (violence, superstition, corruption, submission to the leader).

Changing the Regime and the People
Cultural evolutionism is common in Algerian public debates. By promoting a vision where the characteristics of the “people” explain the persisting corrupt, paternalistic and violent nature of the political order, symbolic analysts reproduce the older notion of “colonizability.” Malek Bennabi, a sociologist and philosopher born in Constantine who notably studied the relationship between Islamic culture and modernity, coined this term in the 1970s. His idea of colonizability explains under-development and colonization by invoking a backward understanding of religion and social inertia. Consequently, he also advocated for cultural and religious reform in order to promote a Muslim renewal in Algeria (Bennabi). Bennabi’s reflection displaces responsibility for the colonial occupation from the imperial power, France, to the occupied people. The philosopher remained influential after his death in 1973. Not only was Bennabi a reference for the djaz’ara, an elitist Islamist
FOCUS

69

trend inside of the FIS (Labat 75-78), he was also an inspiration for a political and cultural movement launched by Nouredine Boukrouh at the end of the 1980s. His heirs are still currently active, most notably in the liberal political party Jil Jadid (“New Generation”). During Boukrouh’s political career, he experimented with various strategies in order to promote socio-political reform. After joining Bouteflika’s early governments as a minister, he subsequently returned to his first love: writing critical analysis of Algerian politics. One of his last essays has an eloquent title: “Reforming People and Power” (Réformer peuple et pouvoir, 2013). Indeed, the idea that in order to end the political deadlock, one has to change the people first, remains a widely shared trope among Algerian intellectual elites.

This last point brings us to our third symbolic analyst, renowned editorial writer (and novelist) Kamel Daoud, who was born in 1970. Since beginning his career in the middle of the 1990s, the journalist from Oran has been a vocal critic of the Algerian regime. His daily column, published in the Quotidien d’Oran under the title Raïna Raïkum (“Our opinion, your opinion”), has allowed him to denounce the corruption of the ruling elite, and the general absurdity of the political order. In 2013, he publicly questioned the anarchic depiction of the people proposed by minister of Interior Dahou Ould Kabia, accusing him of acting in a colonial fashion. The following year, he published a short paper addressed to Bouteflika predicting that the president would be lynched by his own people if he ran for a fourth term.

A firm opponent of the regime, Daoud participated in the protests of January 2011, in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. Yet, despite his commitment in favor of democracy (or precisely because of it), Daoud’s editorials have become more and more directed at the Algerian population. In his daily column, he started to cast the people as guilty for the political deadlock. After initially calling for the fall of the regime, he then regarded the victory of the Islamists in the first elections in Tunisia and in Egypt with hostility, going so far as to ask if “Arabs (were) ready for democracy?” From this perspective, he demonstrates the contradiction of a liberal discourse on democracy that considers conservative or progressive liberalism as the only rightful form of democratic government. Undoubtedly, his personal experiences as a former Islamist sympathizer as well as a journalist who has directly faced the consequences of Jihadi violence must be taken into account. His criticism regarding the inability of Algerians and Arabs to act as “real democrats” draws on his denunciation of a social conservatism that he perceives to be one of the main ills afflicting the country. Moreover, in addition to his critique of Islam and his defense of women’s rights, he also depicts a population unfit for a modern economy, uncivil and dirty. In an editorial published in May 2014, just after Bouteflika’s reelection, he rejected what he labeled a form of “angelism” and “emotional populism” and advocated for a reform of the population:

“Many find their happiness in submission, in devouring and in corruption [emphasis added]. Few are those who think about future generations or collective interests. This is the equation that must be changed, this is the responsibility that we have to accept and demonstrate. Speaking continuously of a people who are victims and “treacherous intellectuals” has now become an annoyingly easy option. What must be changed is this people, these individuals [emphasis added]. We must explain what is a resignation and what is a constitution. We must demonstrate that creating jobs is better than building more mosques. That work is a duty. That effort is glory. That public spirit is not naivety.” (“Oui, il faut changer”)

This editorial illustrates Daoud’s belief that public discussions must now be reori-
ented given the failed attempts to change the political order. Defending the right of intellectuals to be critical of the population, he advocates for a social-cultural aggiornamento in order to instill civic values into the social body. In so doing, he echoes a widely shared position among Algerian symbolic analysts in favor of a reform of the education system. At the same time, he endorses the idea that one should teach the values of modern market economy to the masses, since they are desperately lazy. In short, he proposes a disciplinary undertaking in order to correct popular backwardness.

A Postcolonial and Transnational Configuration

In addition to the various difficulties that these intellectuals faced during the 1990s, one must also consider the history of their political commitments to understand their critical relationship to the “people.” For example, writers have faced the moral, religious or linguistic criteria imposed by the authoritarian state. In response, their political fight has favored a moral and political liberalism rather than a commitment to democracy (Leperlier). At the same time, to fully grasp the consequences of these narratives on the Algerian people, it is useful to look at the postcolonial and transnational dimensions of this phenomenon. When Daoud describes the Algerian people as “three-quarters ignorant, careless of the land that will be handed down [to the next generation], bigoted, dirty, uncivil” (“Pourquoi les Algériens”), one is immediately struck by the similarity with the vocabulary once used to describe the colonized masses. In his afterword to the Wretched of the Earth, the nationalist militant and historian Mohamed Harbi underlines the persisting prejudice regarding the apathetic and anarchic masses after independence, this time held not by French colonists, but Algerian revolutionaries (308). This dualist imagery counterposing a reformist elite to a backward population reproduces a fiction of “modernization from above” that was colonial in origin (Pitt), before becoming a marker of postcoloniality. These narratives of backwardness also rely on the rejection of the Islamist model and a commitment to a liberal ideal, which invokes rationality, civility, and efficiency, as a superior form of modernity. The rejection of an allegedly pre-modern political culture can be traced back to the ethnocentrism underlying liberal thought (Abdel-Nour). From this perspective, the development of an approach based on cultural evolutionism is certainly related to a—sometimes forced—insertion in a globalized space where this normative model is largely promoted. Working in contact with European or American environments, our symbolic analysts appropriate and transform some of the values that are often viewed as so-called benchmarks of Western modernity, such as secularism or gender mixity. It is especially noticeable for French-speaking intellectuals, who are more easily inserted in the northern shore of the Mediterranean. Tellingly, Kamel Daoud publishes his op-eds in renowned Western newspapers such as La Republique, Le Monde and the New York Times. After teaching in France, Lahouari Addi also spent a couple of years in the United States, in prestigious universities such as Princeton and Georgetown. Even the novelist Rachid Boudjedra, who belongs to an older generation and remained a fervent communist, was forced to find refuge in France in the 1960s. For linguistic, political and professional reasons, French-speaking symbolic analysts are exposed to the normative claims that come with an ethnocentric mythology of modernity. Subsequently, they further reinterpret these principles according to their own political agendas and social strategies.

The coupling of the postcolonial and transnational aspects of this configuration is evident when we look at the way in which some of our actors have been welcomed in France. For French-speaking
Algerian writers, the former imperial power remains the place for international recognition, where prominent novelists such as Boudjedra, Khadra or Sansal have been awarded various prizes. Nevertheless, when reproduced in a different space, their discourses change in meaning. For example, in the Algerian context, Boudjedra criticized not only the Islamists, but also the regime and French neo-colonialism. Yet in the French context, he appeared as a spokesman for the critique of the Muslim religion, a faith associated with fundamentalist threats and with the sensitive issue of the veil, while all but ignoring his criticism of the West. After the publication of his pamphlet, Boudjedra became an epitome of resistance to Islamic fundamentalism and was compared to Zola and Voltaire. His criticism of Islam and appropriation of modernist values allowed French journalists to portray him as a promoter of Enlightenment ideas in a country doomed by backward forces. In other terms, the discourse was reinterpreted from the vantage point of the former métropole; while initially produced in a predominantly Muslim society, it was then appropriated in a French context of national anxieties and racial prejudice.

A similar phenomenon occurred in the recent Daoud polemic. In 2013, the journalist published his first novel, a narration of L’Etranger told from the perspective of the brother of the Arab killed by Meursault, Camus’ hero. This novel was warmly welcomed in France, where Daoud was praised as a “new Camus,” an aura that was reinforced when an Algerian Salafist imam launched a fatwa against the journalist in late 2014. While the preacher was later sentenced to jail, these threats revived the memories of the civil war and reinforced Daoud’s position as a leading figure of the Algerian “democratic” intelligentsia. At the beginning of 2016, following the events in Cologne, he published a series of articles in the international press in which he proposed his diagnostic on the pathological relationship to sex existing in the “world of Allah” before suggesting that one should change the soul of the migrants (“Cologne, lieu de fantasmes”). Though the author analyzed an event that occurred in Europe and was directed at a Western audience, his prose was nonetheless marked by his own political commitment against puritanical forces in Algeria. While the article sparked some criticism, it was also met with wide support in the French press, in which Daoud was portrayed as a free spirit advocating for reform in a backward environment. In this context, it is worth noting that another of our symbolic analysts, Lahouari Addi, underlined the risks associated with this transnational configuration. In a text published for the French news website Mediapart, he suggested that despite his accurate depiction of the situation in Muslim countries, Daoud had transgressed a “methodological border” by applying the same analytical frame for Muslims in Europe, thus providing ideological fodder for the European far right (“L’Ecrivain-journaliste”). Indeed, while the critique produced by our analysts in Algeria aims at changing the political and social order, it can be appropriated in France in order to promote Islamophobic agendas. In the former métropole, their Algerian origin serves to legitimize preexisting racial prejudice, as they become what Vincent Geisser labeled as “alibi Muslim intellectuals.”

Conclusion: Naming, Blaming, Claiming in the Postcolony

This paper has studied how symbolic analysts explain the political situation in Algeria in the aftermath of the civil war of the 1990s and given the persistent corruption and authoritarianism under Bouteflika. In offering a diagnosis of the Algerian people, they participate in public discussions and attempt to remedy the longstanding political and economic crisis faced by the polity. In order to better grasp the changes of their diagnosis over time, one can look
at their political and intellectual commitment through an analytical frame used for studying the publicization of disputes, based on the triad concept of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and Sarat). The first term, “naming,” indicates the need to identify the problem and to frame it as a matter of public interest. From this perspective, we can see that the country’s issues are increasingly framed in cultural rather than economic or political terms. As culture becomes the main causal factor for the crisis, the second discursive function of the dispute sees the redirection of the blame from dominant powers (the regime, the neo-colonial West) or specific groups (the Islamists) to the general population. Our symbolic analysts invoke the childish or pathological behavior of the masses in order to explain corruption, violence, economic inefficiency or lack of democracy. Finally, they claim that changing the people’s culture is crucial to ending the political deadlock; they advocate social reform rather than revolution, and view the latter as dangerous given the unpreparedness of the masses. Unsurprisingly, they uphold education and culture as two areas of priority for public policies, in order to shape a modern population. This call for social reform is different from attempts at cultural renewal that occurred at the end of the colonial period. Instead of invoking “indigenous” traits (Islam, Berber or Arab identity), it draws inspiration from liberal standards of reform and echoes prejudices against a local culture that now appears to be unfit for a modern polity. It goes without saying that a long-standing crisis is reflected in certain cultural habits that merit analysis, but it is important not to view the symptoms as if they were the cause. Yet, we have seen that our symbolic analysts can also reproduce a fiction of cultural exception and social backwardness. In so doing, they legitimize both local and foreign interventions aimed at correcting the masses and improving the country’s “human capital.”

Focusing on the population’s behaviors and beliefs not only echoes persistent racial prejudices inside and outside of the postcolony. It also erases the geopolitical and historical factors as well as the global economic structures that explain the Algerian configuration. Finally, limiting the causes of social, economic and political imbalances to local cultural factors indirectly legitimizes the transformative dynamics associated with neoliberal restructuring.

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On New Year’s Eve, an unprecedented wave of aggressions—some of them sexual in nature—struck Germany and especially Cologne. Many of the identified suspects were of North-African origin, others were refugees.

Notes
1 All quotes in this article have been translated to English by the authors.
2 See the articles published by Kamal Guerroua in Le Quotidien d’Oran.
3 A doctorat d’état is a degree coming after the PhD for advanced professors.
4 See the interviews where he comments on the opposition to Bouteflika’s fourth reelection (“L’Opposition de Médiène”) or the replacement of the head of the secret services (“Bouteflika”).
5 On the culture of violence, see for example articles from Salaheddine Menia or Arezki Ighemat, both holding a PhD.
6 See respectively “La Civilisation et l’anarchie” and “Honte à toi.”
7 See “Les Arabes sont-il mûrs.”
8 See for example Eibel or Pautard
9 On New Year’s Eve, an unprecedented wave of aggressions—some of them sexual in nature—struck Germany and especially Cologne. Many of the identified suspects were of North-African origin, others were refugees.

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ISSN: 2196-629X
http://dx.doi.org/10.17192/meta.2017.7.5131