Popular analyses of political discontent among young people converged on a global level after the advent of the economic crisis in 2007-08. They have referred to pervasive alienation, frustration, disappointment, and fear, depicting a generation exploited by ruthless business owners, neglected by policy elites, and abandoned by older generations. The analyses likewise share an understanding of the meaning of ‘youth’, namely a population defined by narrowing economic opportunities under global market capitalism and subsequent protest. This paper attempts to go beyond this conception to explore the emergence of a new framework for agency. More specifically, the paper aims to go beyond interpreting the behavior of ‘youth’ in the Arab World, especially among educated young men and women, as simply about protest. Instead, the paper posits that concurrent trends in privatization of public services, increasing individual and local responsibility for social problems and job creation, job insecurity, and greater exposure to rights and government accountability are influencing capacity to influence local change and likewise, challenging boundaries between social, political, and economic agency. Drawing on longstanding research on social activism in Morocco, the paper adapts the language of theorists of generational formation and consciousness (see Edmunds and Turner 2002, 2005) to argue that the initial consequence of market reform in the eighties and nineties was the formation of an ‘interval generation’, disenfranchised economically and unrepresented politically. Over the past 5-10 years, though, the entrenchment of globalization and neoliberal ideology have led to the emergence of an ‘active generation’ maneuvering to influence policy and liberal market capitalism through altering local economic and social opportunities. This maneuvering is particularly apparent in the rise of social entrepreneurship, not just as an employment policy, but also as an indicator of how the boundaries between economic, political, and social agency at a local level have blurred.

**Keywords:** youth; North Africa; entrepreneurship; identity
Introduction
Popular analyses of political discontent among young people converged on a global level after the advent of the economic crisis in 2007-08. They have referred to pervasive alienation, frustration, disappointment, and fear, depicting a generation (see Edmunds and Turner) exploited by ruthless business owners, neglected by policy elites, and abandoned by older generations. Looking for alternative political ideas, they turn to right-wing (Bayer; Mondon and Bowman) or left-wing populism (Mounk), radical religious groups, or just to the streets, to protest. Writing for the *South China Morning Post*, Yonden Lahtoo criticizes property developers preying on the youth demographic by building shoebox-sized flats and mis-marketing them as ‘trendy’ homes for the young, upcoming proletariat. Add other unsavory predators to the mix, such as businessmen renting out cubicle sleeping spaces that resemble hyperbaric chambers, and you have a cesspool of greed and desperation that is not just a blight on this city [Hong Kong], but on humanity itself. (November 17, 2016)

Reports on protests in Russia, the United States, Europe, and the Arab World are strikingly similar, describing a newly mobilized generation desirous of a more stable, promising future. A young man quoted in the *New York Times* commented that the unexpectedly high turnout among young people at the March 2017 anti-corruption protests in Russia was because young people “just want to live like normal, modern people in the rest of Europe” (Higgins and Kramer A1). An article on the left-leaning American news site *Salon* challenged the criticism of the ‘millennials’ as lazy and over-protected and pointed out that,

In 2015, millennials became the largest voting bloc in the nation, overtaking baby boomers. And, despite the hype, millennials are voting. Even more, they are protesting and organizing and making their voices heard.” (McClenne1)

The same references to suffering from decision-making or negligence amongst political elites and the grim future young people may face characterize analyses of protest and alienation in the Arab World. The 20 Fevrier movement in Morocco during 2011-2012 was supposed to, as in Russia in 2017 or Hong Kong in 2016, fight corruption and make the government more accountable, particularly for their future. As one journalist said of the demonstrations several years afterwards,

During this period, most political parties were terrified of the youth’s rebellion, disobedience, and their strong insistence to speak out against inequality and injustice by manifesting their claims and demands in the streets instead of with ink and paper (Igrouane).

In response, the Moroccan government did amend the constitution to protect the right of assembly and peaceful demonstration and the right to join trade unions and parties, but the practical exercise of these rights has remained legally ambiguous (Madani et al 21). Thus, though more stable politically than other countries in the region, with its high unemployment (and most likely underemployment) rates among young people, declining public health and education services, and persistent concentration of power in political elites, Morocco possesses a similar context for disenfranchisement to other countries in the Arab World and elsewhere.

Beyond the common characterization of this disenfranchisement, the analyses share a conceptual understanding of what ‘youth’ is, namely a population defined by narrowing economic opportunities under
global market capitalism and subsequent protest. This paper attempts to go beyond a conception of youth as a passive construct of international and national policies and economic ideology and trends (Sukarieh and Tannock; France and Threadgold) to explore the emergence of a new framework for agency. Though I am not an expert in youth studies, the paper develops upon a debate in the field concerning the political economy of youth, namely on the relative importance of economic (neoliberal) ideology and inequality to the identity and behavior of young people. Sukarieh and Tannock describe this approach to the study of youth as concerning “how (and whether) individuals and groups come to be constituted as ‘youth’ in the first instance.” The analysis itself is of “the continuously changing nature and significance of youth as an identity, social category and ideology, in relation to the broader contexts of local, national and global culture, society, politics and economy” (1283). More specifically, the paper aims to go beyond interpreting the behavior of ‘youth’ in the Arab World, especially among educated young men and women, as simply about protest. Instead, the paper posits that concurrent trends in the privatization of public services, increasing individual and local responsibility for social problems and job creation, job insecurity, and greater exposure to rights and government accountability are influencing capacity to influence local change and, likewise, challenging boundaries between social, political, and economic agency. I suggest that the consequence has been to alter perceptions among young people as to how they can demonstrate their own power and achieve recognition.

Drawing on longstanding research on social activism in Morocco, the paper adapts the language of theorists of generational formation and consciousness (see Edmunds and Turner) to argue that the initial consequence of market reform in the eighties and nineties was the formation of an ‘interval generation’, disenfranchised economically and unrepresented politically. Over the past 5-10 years, though, the entrenchment of globalization and neoliberal ideology has led to the emergence of an ‘active generation’ maneuvering to influence policy and liberal market capitalism through altering local economic and social opportunities. This maneuvering is particularly apparent in the rise of social entrepreneurship, not just as an employment policy, but also as an indicator of how the boundaries between economic, political, and social agency at a local level have blurred. In Morocco - with its longstanding embrace of entrepreneurship to counter unemployment, political support for civil society, and a policy of decentralization, accelerated since the constitutional reforms of 2011 - the ambition to instigate change at a local level and the blurring of boundaries between sectors may be more pronounced than in countries such as Jordan, where the public sector is more predominant.

The paper first discusses how theorists have situated ‘youth’ within historical context, and then explores how analysis of generational change can reveal transformation in the meaning and practice of citizenship and suggest long-term economic and political implications.

**Conceptualizing Moroccan ‘Youth’ in Historical Context**

**Distinguishing Generations Over Time**

Conceptualizing the agency of youth in relation to a particular political economic context differs from theories of generations, namely those originally developed by Karl Mannheim. The latter are rooted in demographics and the viability of a coherent, cohesive perception of commonality and purpose shared across individuals.
and groups of similar ages. Mannheim explains that

Fundamental integrative attitudes and formative principles are all-important. . . in the handing down of every tradition, firstly because they alone can bind groups together, secondly, and, what is perhaps even more important, they alone are really capable of becoming the basis of continuing practice” (305).

Building upon Mannheim’s work, Eyerman and Turner define ‘generation’ as a cohort of persons passing through time who come to share a common habitus, hexis, and culture, a function of which is to provide them with a collective memory that serves to integrate the cohort over a finite period of time” (93).

Drawing particularly from the experience of the Sixties, they add that generations are constituted by traumatic events, protest against dominant cultures, competition for resources, collective memory enhanced by the valorization of particular physical spaces (i.e. Woodstock in the Sixties), and passage through specific economic periods, such as the Great Depression or the more current Great Recession (96).

This passage through specific economic periods resonates with the explanations cited above of youth protest and anger. Edmunds and Turner (“Global generations: social change in the twentieth century”), in a later theorization of generations, propose considering generations in Marxist terms of ‘in itself’ and ‘for itself’. They argue that generations make the transition from being a ‘passive cohort’ to a ‘self-conscious cohort’ when they “are able to exploit resources (political/educational/economic) to innovate in cultural, intellectual or political spheres” (561). They write:

In our theory, resources, opportunity and strategic leadership combine to constitute active generations. Thus, intergenerational change could be conceptualized in principle as alternating between active and passive generations. An active generation that transforms social and cultural life tends to be followed by a passive one that simply inherits the changes produced by its more successful predecessor (561). Following Mannheim as well as Bourdieu, they portray generations in conflict over resources, as “an active generation closes off potential advantages to successive generations.”

Active generations can also “act strategically within a field to influence significantly the opportunities for collective action of future cohorts” (561).

I suggest that social entrepreneurship in Morocco, though still highly limited, indicates the shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ and with the latter motivation, or to alter, rather than close off, opportunities for future generations.

Market Reform in Morocco and the Context for Generational Change

Situating analysis of generational change within a political economic context, young men and women in postcolonial Morocco arguably identified citizenship with social mobility within the nation-state. Job opportunities and the possibility of economic security (owning a house and consumer goods, the possibility of savings and/or a pension) were linked to public investment in a national society. Political participation focused on, whether in opposition to or in support of the government and the monarchy, political ideology and party agendas. In the market reform period, ‘youth’ became associated with marginalization within economic globalization and the decline of the nation-state, and likewise pervasive political alienation and disaffection, as citizenship ceased to
have the economic implications of the postcolonial era. (Cohen "Alienation and Globalization in Morocco," Searching for a Different Future).

However, market reform policies generated diverse forms of change, not just economic but also in the public sphere and political and social activism. With market liberalization and, notably, more complex and wider relations with international funding bodies such as the World Bank, government became more decentralized, social development more associated with local initiative, and public administration more responsive to local input and feedback. The 2011 Constitution reinforced these trends, stating in the First Article,

The territorial organization of the Kingdom is decentralized, founded on an advanced system of regionalization and recognizing that

The citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine] have [disposent] the right to present petitions to the public powers (Constitute Project).

Article 27 reinforces this point, stating,

The citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine] have the right of access to information held by the public administration, the elected institutions and the organs [organismes] invested with missions of public service.

The Constitution also provides in Article 31 for

The State, the public establishments and the territorial collectivities to provide equal access to, among other services, healthcare, education 'of quality', 'water and to a healthy environment', and 'lasting [durable] development'.

On a practical level, despite criticism for a lack of vision of social justice and, likewise, instrumentalization of anti-poverty programs to maintain political and economic power, social development policies initiated under King Mohammed VI such as the Initiative Nationale de Developpement Humain have provided employment in social action and, importantly, normalized local activism, especially among young people, as an expression of citizenship (Cohen). The official description of INDH states that,

This community project is a major advance in accordance with the participatory and partnership approach to development. Proactive and multidimensional, the INDH is based on a decentralized approach that promotes access to decision-making; illustrating a targeted policy and strongly rooted at local level.

It then describes one of the program's benefits as

Talking about the civil society evokes the Highest Royal Will to allow all Moroccans (women and men) to participate individually and collectively in the development challenges (INDH).

The effect of greater political and policy attention to governance, government accountability, and civic activism, alongside persistent unemployment rates, has been to broaden public debate concerning political reform and on an individual level, integrate practical action into the meaning of citizenship, or beyond access to public services for individual gain. Indeed, King Hassan II introduced these new dimensions to the public sphere and citizenship when he spoke publically about the World Bank's assessment of Morocco's economic future in the early Nineties (Catusse; Lamlili; World Bank). In doing so, he instigated a break with Morocco's economic model of endoge-
meta
nous growth and the severity of government control over public information. The result was to associate external pressure for economic liberalization with political reform. Seemingly contradictory in his politics, a young journalist and prominent critic of the regime in the mid-Nineties told me once, “The World Bank is enforcing accountability.” His hope was that the Bank’s interventions would increase transparency in economic activity, especially among political and business elites. Discussing the availability of information in Morocco, the director of an international NGO called Hassan II’s recognition of World Bank economic concerns in 1993 a ‘watershed’ moment, when dissemination of information about policymaking and public institutions began to evolve into a public right.

As public institutions have come under pressure in subsequent decades to become more responsive to citizens, the promotion of local civic activism and push toward private sector employment have integrated social change with participation in the global market economy. Rather than join political parties or movements, as in the post-colonial period, political expression among young people who have grown up under market reform is now interrelated with challenging the organizational forms and values that sustain market capitalism. Though arguably young people have retreated from directly challenging the regime (Engelcke, Desruès), this does not preclude other forms of political activism aimed at transforming social and economic structures.

Investigating a Generational Shift

The Formation of an Interval Generation

From the eighties onwards, young people leaving lycée, university, or vocational school encountered the effects of structural adjustment and market reform measures, which sharply decreased their employment, and life, opportunities. They became an ‘interval generation’, caught between the decline of an identification of life chances with the nation-state, the ambiguity and insecurity of globalization, the inaccessibility of political power, and limitations on freedom of expression. Analyses of the Arab Spring in particular have highlighted the loss of social belonging engendered by unemployment and lack of capacity to alter the future. A chapter in a 2014 World Bank report on youth unemployment in Tunisia leads with a quote on the existential meaning of a job from an unemployed young man from Sidi Bouzid, where the Arab Spring began:

> For us, unemployment is a kind of blasphemy; an unemployed is not a person, society itself does not accept him, he is not part of the circle of society. That is the true meaning of “unemployed”: a person who is not active in the heart of the society. Tell me, what use is that person? (24)

Speaking at a special session of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) governing body in 2011, Dorothea Schmidt, a senior specialist in unemployment at the ILO, explained that low wages, lack of social protection and contractual security, and subsequent distrust in the possibility of social mobility have had a predictable effect on confidence in political institutions and politicians. In a press release for the meeting, she is quoted as saying, “it is no wonder that many young people are angry” (ILO).

Despite the recognition of political consequences of unemployment and economic insecurity, policy responses have focused largely on strengthening the connection between skill development, particularly at the level of post-baccalaureate education and vocational training, and job market supply. A few policy recommendations have pushed for minor changes, such as making information about openings more
meta accessible and the introduction of unem-
ployment insurance, which Morocco
implemented in 2014, though targeted at
those with employment experience rather
than new jobseekers. The dominant nar-
rative of job creation, however, is reflected
in King Mohammed VI’s Discours Royal in
August 2014:

To develop qualified human resources
is a major priority for enhancing com-
petition and responding as well to the
requirements of development and the
job market and should complement
the advancement and diversification of
the national economy.

The reduction of job creation to cultivating
human resources neglects both the exis-
tential importance of a job conveyed
explicitly in the World Bank Report and
how particular jobs become important
existentially. More importantly, it misses
the emergence of alternative forms of
political expression facilitated by other
policy strategies and programs, as well as
the globalization of the economy. These
trends have potentially led to the forma-
tion of a new, in Edmunds and Turner’s
perspective, ‘active’ generation that blurs
the boundaries between citizenship and
economic opportunity. This shift ironically
echoes the substance of post-national
social contracts, where social mobility and
citizenship intersected, but the underlying
rationale for this relation is not to stabilize
and legitimize the nation-state. Rather, the
blurred boundaries reflect the nation-
state’s decline and both the general void
left for developing new frameworks of
political activism and the specific conse-
quences of devolution policies and the
normalization of civic engagement for at
least perceived capacity to instigate
change at a local level.

The Symbolic Importance of Social
Entrepreneurship
To investigate generational change today,
I suggest looking at social entrepre-
neurship, not as a policy strategy to create jobs
or address poverty, but rather as an indica-
tion of how the individual would-be entre-
preneurs at a local level distinguish pos-
sibilities for individual agency. The term
‘social enterprise’ itself is ambiguous and
atemporal, perhaps enhancing its value in
development policy. Dacin and Tracey dis-
tinguish social entrepreneurship by its
mission: “creating social value by provid-
ing solutions to social problems” (Dacin
and Tracey 1204). Martin and Osberg
adopt their definition from Schumpeter,
substituting social aims for profitmaking
while engaging in the same entrepre-
neurial pursuit of new ideas that renders obso-
lete other methods.

In Morocco, King Hassan II’s statement in
1988 during the opening session of
Parliament reinforced the importance of
entrepreneurism as a political economic
strategy:

Moroccans are entrepreneurial and
very often aspire to become, at their
own scale, entrepreneurs. We now
have to encourage such aspirations, it
should not be that potential entrepre-
neurs feel confined within an economy
where they are barred access due eit-
her to the concentration of private ca-
pital or public enterprises.

The late King added that the goal was to
create the conditions for new entrepre-
eurs to take risks and assume respon-
sibility so that they could become agents in
economic development (Catusse 52).
Political support for entrepreneurism led
to the creation of the oft-criticized (La Vie
Eco “Crédit Jeunes Promoteurs”) program
Jeunes Promoteurs (L’Economiste) and
other, more recent efforts. For instance,
the World Bank has recently invested $50
million in support for start-ups, with
the aim, as stated by the Maghreb Director
Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly, to ease
“access to opportunities for entrepreneurs” because entrepreneurship “is the path to an inclusive growth that is beneficial to all Moroccans” (World Bank “Small enterprises”).

Undoubtedly, entrepreneurship has come to function as a policy alternative for public sector job creation. A baseline report on youth unemployment produced by the organization S4YE (Solutions for Youth Employment) and funded by the World Bank highlights the expectation that entrepreneurship can decrease unemployment rates, especially among young, educated Moroccans. In the press release announcing the report, the S4YE Coalition Manager, Matt Hobson, remarks,

The report shows that young people are by inclination more entrepreneurial than adults - and we now know that of all the interventions governments, private sector and civil society implement to address youth employment, providing support to early entrepreneurs is the most effective (World Bank “Youth unemployment”).

The report itself concludes that entrepreneurship reflects initiative, ambition, and desire for independence from economic forces: (S4YE 2015, 58). Analyses of social entrepreneurship (Martin and Osberg; Dacin and Tracey; Eppler, Kerlin) also associate entrepreneurial initiative with youth and the desire to help ‘their communities’.

Dart writes that,

As business becomes a more preeminent organizational model and as increasingly wide swaths of human society become conceptualized as markets, then the businesslike hybrid face of social enterprise is legitimate and in fact responsive to the times (421).

In Morocco, The World Bank, in partnership with the British Council, has supported social entrepreneurship to generate economic opportunity and to foster responses to local problems. Their program, launched in 2015, consisted of a boot camp entitled ‘Provision of Employment and Inclusion Services for Youth in Morocco’ for social entrepreneurs that included training for 30 social entrepreneurs and $10,000 in financing for 10 social enterprises selected through competition. The British Council launched a second program in 2016, Social Entreprenorth, which is directed at supporting social enterprise in Northern Morocco. Like its predecessor, this program is intended to “develop locally-owned, innovative solutions to social and economic challenges,” and specifically, “to train a team of social enterprise trainers and help students gain the skills to secure employment or start their own social enterprises.” Another aim is to develop better relations with local government so that they become “more responsive to youth needs, improve service delivery, and support social enterprise (British Council).”

Examples of social enterprises include Sanady, founded in 2006, which provides educational support through teacher training, after-hours classes, and school refurbishment to children in multiple cities in Morocco. Other, newer social enterprises like Tamkeen in Tangiers run educational workshops to encourage creativity. Looly’s and Al-Ikram (Media24 “La première entreprise sociale”) provide employment to low-income groups through the manufacture of food products or crafts or facilitate market access for small local businesses through online platforms (e.g. Anarouz).

The growing prominence of social entrepreneurship (The Guardian), as perhaps youth entrepreneurship in general, does not preclude its high failure rate. Adnane
Addioui, the director of MCISE, an organization that supports the incubation of social enterprises, told me that of approximately 2000 expressions of interest over the past several years, only 78 were established and only 20 of these have survived (Doane; Cohen *Personal Conversation*).

Of the 30 participants in the British Council-World Bank project, and the 10 that received financial support, allegedly only two are still functioning. In his analysis of social entrepreneurship in Morocco, Faouzi notes that the impact of social enterprise remains minimal, referring in particular to the inefficiency of cooperatives (there are approximately 12,000 in Morocco, according to him, with about 450,000 members). Angel-Urdinola concurs in his own analysis, stating that businesses that serve marginalized populations are ‘rare’ in Morocco (World Bank Blogs), while a British Council report states that in Morocco, “Awareness of social enterprise is considered to be extremely low” (Angel-Urdinola 6, World Bank). The same British Council report on social enterprise in Morocco remarks:

> It is clear that the social enterprise movement is being driven by a relatively small circle of people; this circle of people share common characteristics – notably, graduates of higher education and exposure to international ideas and experiences on social enterprise – which have clearly influenced their thinking on social enterprise development in Morocco.

In other words, only those able to connect to international organizations and sources of capital can lead national efforts to promote social entrepreneurship.

At the same time, though the impact of social enterprises is still essentially unknown, as the majority are relatively new. The evaluations of older initiatives indicate steady growth in networks, projects, and funding sources, as well as effective use of services. Sanady’s 2014-15 report (Sanady *Rapport 2015*) states that in a national survey of more than 1700 pupils, 980 parents, and 141 teachers, 97% of the pupils claimed their academic results had improved, whereas 95% of the teachers stated that they were very satisfied with their working conditions and 99% felt that their efforts were valued. A somewhat lower percentage, 73%, of the parents expressed satisfaction with their children’s education. Overall, in 2015, the foundation provided educational programs to 4100 pupils and partnered with 38 companies. The number of pupils was more than double the figure cited in the 2011-2012 report, or 1905 pupils, while the number of partner companies was 25 (Sanady *Rapport 2011-2012*).

Local social enterprise has greater implications, though, than employment or even the delivery of a service. It indicates a desire for autonomy and freedom, realized through constructing community, or building social solidarity across different socio-economic groups. The S4YE report generalizes the behavior and attitudes of young people to undergird policy objectives, but the rhetoric also notes the wish for ‘control’. This control is identified with initiative and engagement across social and sometimes ethnic and religious diversity (Murphy and Coombes). Addioui remarked that very few of the young entrepreneurs that contacted him were from Rabat or Casablanca and were not necessarily Francophone. They were also often not from families with means, and despite the anxiety and fear of their parents, who needed reliable income, assumed the risk of launching an enterprise.

Social enterprise requires linking global movement of capital, goods, and ideas, social media, and local social change. Without financial support in Morocco, social entrepreneurs have to turn to international foundations like Drosos and national or international competitions.
launched by agencies like the World Bank and the British Council, organizations like Seedstars,10 and companies like Orange.11 They can also access crowdfunding through online platforms like Kickstarter.

Beyond the practical implications of setting up an enterprise, I suggest that the interrelation between economic opportunity, political expression, and social status indicates the possible formation of a different generation than the one marginalized by the decline of the public sector and political disinterest. In interviews, experienced social activists in Morocco consistently noted the shift in interest among young people, regardless of location, in connecting economic opportunity to local social change and, implicitly or explicitly, political engagement. They remarked frequently in recent conversations (Summer 2017) that younger activists have different expectations than their older counterparts. For instance, the program director of a well-established Moroccan organization noted in an interview that young people view leaders in the sector as ‘opportunistic’ and ‘corrupt’, seeking to reinforce personal status and networks through social action. These leaders have also possessed the independent resources to engage in social activism as a vocation, whereas younger activists have required employment. Unlike their older colleagues as well, they concentrate on immediate local issues, or at commune or even neighborhood level, rejecting the national scope of older organizations. They are engaged in local politics, the program director commented, even if they feel distant from national affairs.

A much younger social activist, who had worked with a number of social enterprises in Rabat and Casablanca, reiterated the distance and suspicion her generation felt toward leaders in social action and civil society in Morocco. “The older generation thinks in terms of charity,” she said. She also criticized how the ‘older generation’ based in the ‘North’ (Casablanca and Rabat) lack contact with local residents, who were suspicious of externally driven projects. She preferred a “more straightforward method, or talking directly through roundtables” to generate “trust with people on the ground.”

Conclusion: The Implications for the Youth of the Future

The preeminence of local social action in the description and practice of social enterprise upends Zygmunt Bauman’s fears that “being local in a globalized world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation” and that “[L]ocalities are losing their meaning-generating and meaning-negotiating capacity and are increasingly dependent on sense-giving and interpreting actions which they do not control” (Bauman 12). Instead, social enterprise makes transforming the local context an avenue for accessing and even influencing globalization.

This paper suggests that social enterprise reflects a generational shift, where, echoing the postcolonial social contract, economic security has become reconnected to citizenship. Today, however, citizenship is constituted differently from belonging to the nation-state and the expectation that the opportunity for social mobility will legitimize political authority. Instead, citizenship among young people in particular often bypasses the national government as an object of reform, allegiance, or contestation, targeting instead the more immediate transformation of local conditions through the utilization and alteration of market mechanisms and pressure on local government. National programs like INDH or the limited resources for social entrepreneurship provide an opportunity for individual activism and maneuvering for local political influence, where citizenship becomes associated with social intervention. Though still emerging as a social
Shana Cohen

is the Director of TASC, a progressive think tank based in Ireland that examines issues of inequality and democracy in Europe and the world. She is also an affiliated researcher with the University of Cambridge. Her most recent research has focused on social action and civic activism in Morocco and the UK.

email: sc736@cam.ac.uk

process, the effect may be to force the question of if and how this new generation’s efforts will be recognized and whether or not the blurred boundaries between economic, political, and social agency will, in turn, challenge the divisions between public and private sector and charity and collective benefit.
Notes

1 The Brexit vote in the UK highlighted intergenerational tensions and anxiety about the future among young people. Letters to the newspaper The Guardian (June 24, 2016) from teenagers spoke of outrage, disgust, exclusion, and a dimming future. One writer stated, “Mostly I am outraged that this decision, which reflects on the British people, has been made without my consent. The future already looks less bright for us and it is a future I did not have a say in shaping.” Another blamed older people who voted for a political and policy rupture that would most likely never affect them and called the vote a betrayal of her future: “One thing that upsets me most is that this decision has been made by people who will not have to live with the consequences for as long as us. Young people voted to remain and older people voted to leave. I feel that I have been let down by an older generation who won’t be affected by the volatility of this decisions.” Those who would remain largely unaffected or benefit financially from leaving the European Union had thought only of themselves, and not other citizens or even their heirs.

2 Zemni and Bogaert argue that with INDH, “The logic of participation has become a matter of linking state institutions with ‘non-state’ experts, NGOs and other social and economic partners. This technocratic approach to development evacuates to a large extent the possibility of politics as conflict is translated into a development target that has a solution based on certain kinds of expertise and knowledge.” (412).


4 See http://fr.cctv.com/2016/05/19/ARTI9wytaWf5GvLWStIClk60519.shtml for a few figures.

5 La loi no 03-14 complétant et modifiant le dahir no 1-72-184

6 The webpage describes the project as having “three components: 1) The first component, Financing Program, will target the following funding categories: angel/seed, early-stage, and VC stage. It has the following subcomponents: (i) Angel/Seed financing(s); and (ii) Early stage/VC fund(s). 2) The second component, Ecosystem Support, will support organizations within the entrepreneurship ecosystem in the project area to stimulate new innovative enterprises. It has the following subcomponents: (i) Pre-seed Grants; (ii) Soft Loans; and (iii) Entrepreneurship Support. 3) The third component, Project Management, Coordination, and Monitoring and Evaluation, will fund the Project Management Unit (PMU) and all of its incremental eligible operational and administrative costs for the management and supervision of the project over the project life (six years).” http://projects.worldbank.org/P150928?lang=en

7 See http://dareinc.mcise.org/nos-startups/ for a list supported by MCISE.

8 See http://www.sanady.org/home/

9 See http://www.tamkeencommunity.org

10 See https://www.seedstars.com

11 See http://entrepreneurclub.orange.com/fr/
Works Cited


Lahtoo, Yonden. “Hong Kong’s angry youth are rebellious, not stupid.” South China Morning Post, 17 November 2016.


Mohammed VI, Royal Speech, 20 Aug.2014.


