This article will examine Ottoman and British diplomatic correspondence and the satirical press and argue that during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78, representatives of the Great Powers conceived of a hierarchy of masculinities that became a major part of their diplomatic rhetoric. At the top of this order was the masculinity that European statesmen saw in themselves and legitimized their imperialist projects; they particularly emphasized honor, and ascribed what they viewed as positive governmental traits – such as safety, order, rational thinking, and secularism – as masculine and civilized and their opposites as feminine and barbarous. Until the end of this crisis, Ottoman officials sought to convince their European counterparts that they should accept them with honor and dignity, and therefore a qualified equality. Thus, Ottomans did not challenge the European belief in a hierarchy of masculinities but sought instead to prove that the new Ottoman statesman was himself properly masculine and had the moral imperative to rule over the lesser peoples of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, Ottoman officials depicted Christian separatists as cruel, savage, and too ignorant for independence, mirroring the gendered arguments that anti-Ottoman Europeans made about the Ottomans.

Keywords: Ottoman diplomacy, Eastern Question, masculinity

In the historiography of The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, both gender and the Ottoman perspective in diplomatic histories are underdeveloped. Most older works do not even problematize the centering of the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia). Instead, despite the Eastern Question directly concerning Ottoman lands and peoples, these historians ignored Ottoman concerns and reduced Ottoman officials to mere partisans of a Great Power (see Harris, Marriott, Millman), rather than statesmen with competing beliefs on the best diplomatic alliances for safeguarding Ottoman independence.

There are exceptions to this within the Ottoman field, such as the edited volumes on the Ottoman-Russian war (Yavuz and Sluglett, Turan), F.A.K. Yasamee’s book, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888, and Roderic H. Davison’s works, particularly Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms.

However, these books all ignore how gender, in this case hegemonic masculinity, affected nineteenth-century diplomacy. This article adopts R.W. Connell’s argument for multiple simultaneously existing masculinities, with a hegemonic masculinity (Connell 77). Few men will ever achieve this status, but because of their influence,
it determines the most honored way of being a man within its historical context (Connell and Messerschmidt 832). Unlike the above-mentioned books, Ali Bilgiç’s *Power and the West: Gendered International Relations and Foreign Policy* examines gender, interrogating how Great Powers have feminized or hypermasculinized Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, prompting Turkish and Ottoman leaders to embrace Westernization programs and promote their state as properly civilized and masculine (Bilgiç, “Introduction” 73); however, Bilgiç’s research begins in 1895 and does not discuss the time period of this article. This article, in addition to analyzing the diplomatic correspondence of the Ottoman and British foreign ministries, will examine satirical journals published in Istanbul and London. These journals will demonstrate that the satirical press in both empires had a shared conception of hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, examining these journals is critical because this was the first major European war where the public received daily updates of the war (İşçi 188; Davison, “Advent” 155). This is necessary as both Ottoman and British officials regularly cited public opinion in defense of their actions. The importance of masculinity during this time might not be readily apparent, as officially recognized diplomacy was nearly the exclusive purview of men. But how masculinity was manifested in Ottoman and Great Power diplomacy during this specific time period had a direct influence on decision-makers’ policies. From 1875-1878, the dominant concerns of the international system were the maintenance of the balance of power and the spread of civilization. While the Great Powers had agreed following the Crimean War that the survival of the Ottoman Empire was necessary to maintain the balance, it was conditional on the Ottomans instituting administrative reforms to ameliorate its military, finances, and the rights of its Christian subjects. The crisis threatened to alienate the Ottoman Empire from the Great Powers, including its closest ally, England. Consequently, throughout the crisis Ottoman officials sought to convince the cabinets of the Great Powers that the Ottoman Empire was still essential to the balance of power and that the Ottomans were civilized. The latter was especially important, as barbarous powers could be a legitimate target for Great Power intervention or imperialism. Because European conceptions of civilization and barbarity were heavily gendered - traits associated with civilization were gendered as masculine and those of barbarity as feminine - Ottoman diplomacy was also gendered, seeking to show that the Ottoman state and its officials were properly masculine and civilized. The individuals who made up the governments of the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire desired the survival of their states, but above all, they desired the maintenance of their honor, independence, and sovereignty, which necessitated positioning the state as properly masculine. In Europe, this construction utilized hierarchies of race, religion, class, and states, all of which they viewed as proof of their civilized nature and thus the right and obligation to rule lesser men and all women of the world (Parpart and Zalewski, “Introduction” 11). Ottoman officials did not challenge the European hierarchical view of masculinity. Instead, they argued that Ottoman elites as well as the Ottoman Empire belonged to the premier class of men and states. Throughout the crisis, Ottoman and Great Power officials used masculinity to explain and defend their actions, appealing to honor and dignity and claiming an ability to rationally direct or restrain the violence of men underneath their rule.

**Honor among Ottomans**

In Stanley Lane-Poole’s biography of Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1842-58, he
FOCUS

quoted a conversation between Canning and Mustafa Reşid Pasha in London while Reşid was the Ottoman ambassador to England. Reşid asked Canning where the Ottoman Empire should start its reforms, to which Canning replied:

‘At the beginning.’ ‘What do you mean by the beginning?’ he said. ‘Security of life and property, of course,’ I rejoined. ‘Would not you add the protection of honour?’ he asked. ‘No doubt,’ I said. But in truth I wondered what he meant by honour among Turks, until I recollected their practice of applying the bastinado without discrimination to persons of any class or rank whatever.’ (Lane-Poole 105).

The meaning of honor can be nebulous and changed over time within the Ottoman world. Examining honor in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Leslie Pierce argues that Ottoman sultans abducting the dependents of political rivals improved the reputation of the state while also serving as the strongest attack on the honor of their enemies, but by the seventeenth century Ottomans viewed abductions as a potential threat to the state (Pierce 313). This shift coincided with Ottoman sultans no longer going out on campaign, risking defeat and loss of honor. Instead, they would command one of their pashas to lead in their place, as they could be publicly humiliated for any defeats without threatening the Sultan’s honor (Pierce 320, 324). Başak Tuğ argues that by the eighteenth century, both the Ottoman state and its subjects viewed upholding Ottomans’ honor as a central duty of the government in providing justice and a key legitimating factor for the Sultan, shown by the frequent references to honor in correspondence between the government and Ottoman subjects (Tuğ 2). In 1839, at the behest of Reşid – who was now Grand Vizier - Sultan Abdülmecid promulgated the Tanzimat Reform Edict, which called for the protection of all subjects' life, liberty, honor, and property, codifying the state's duty to protect its subjects' honor. Importantly for elite men like Reşid, this would also require the Sultan to respect their honor as well as their lives and property, rather than be valid scapegoats or subject to the Sultan’s whims (Hanioğlu 73).

Ottoman reformers, like Reşid, believed in the necessity of these reforms to strengthen the Empire, but Ottoman reforms cannot be entirely separated from Ottoman diplomacy. Ottoman diplomats promised that these reforms would improve the condition of Ottoman Christians in hopes of gaining European alliances against external threats, entangling Ottoman domestic and foreign policy. Likewise, upholding honor became not only a domestic concern but a foreign one as well. In Europe, modern notions of new political rights and civic honor greatly influenced the European diplomatic norms the Ottomans accepted. Personal honor retained value, but equal dignity had replaced positional honor, as men were now citizens with a theoretically equal status (LaVaque-Manty 715).

Similarly, European states were acknowledging one another’s sovereignty, accepting parity between European states, and viewing diplomatic practices – such as kneeling - that implied subservience as feminine and thus undignified, dishonorable, and barbarous (Frevert 141).

Just as not all men (and no women) yet had equal status despite the rhetoric, the same was true of states. To be accorded equal dignity and honor, the state had to also be viewed in Europe as a civilized power and thus worthy of international legal and Westphalian sovereignty, which granted international recognition of their territory and the exclusion of external actors in their internal affairs (Krasner 3-4, 16-20). In practice, few non-European states ever attained this recognition and were instead characterized as barbarous or uncivilized (Keene 5-7). These labels were gendered, with civilization being associated with masculine virtues such as safe, rational, orderly, modern, and secu-
lar, while barbaric states were connected to feminine vices such as dangerous, reactionary, chaotic, backwards, and fanatical (Bilgiç “Reproduction of Power Hierarchies” 607, 888). Ottoman foreign policy was thus designed to construct an image of the Ottoman Empire as a civilized and properly masculine state, whose international and Westphalian sovereignty would be recognized.

The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 started in the town of Nevesinje in Herzegovina in the summer of 1875 and the rebellion quickly spread to neighboring Bosnia. Although the Porte argued that the rebellion was strictly an internal Ottoman affair, Austria-Hungary and Russia developed a plan to submit to the Porte for pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sultan Abdülaziz replied that he wished to introduce governmental reforms which were compatible with his sovereignty, but he could not accept any foreign proposals, as “this would be committing suicide, and I prefer to die on my throne” (Foreign Office, 424:39, 327). Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to London, made a similar argument to Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary. Speaking of Gyula Andrássy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Musurus told Derby that Mehmed Raşid Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, was concerned that Andrássy’s proposal would not conform to the Great Powers’ treaties respecting the independence of the Ottoman Empire nor the Sultan’s dignity. The Porte would accept friendly advice from the Great Powers but argued that they should give their advice to the Porte in an unofficial manner so that it would not imply the Porte was subservient (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VII, 183-4). Mahmud Nedim Pasha, the Grand Vizier, informed Sir Henry Elliot, the British ambassador, that if the ambassadors of the Great Powers insisted on presenting the Andrássy Note in an official manner, “he would not be the medium of laying upon His Majesty the affront which would be implied by the communication of a concerted official note” (Foreign Office, 424:40, 49).

All of the Great Powers save for Great Britain agreed to the terms of the Andrássy Note, however, and the Porte signaled that it would not make any more objections to the plan so long as it did not contain anything prejudicial to Ottoman sovereignty or “calculated to wound the national feeling” (Foreign Office, 424:40, 54-5). Finally, on January 31, 1876, the ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia presented the Andrássy Note to the Porte, and on February 13th Abdülaziz issued a ferman (edict) accepting four of the note’s five points (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VII, 275). The Porte’s primary concern had not been the terms of the note, but how the Great Powers intended to present it. To meekly accept an official note of proposed reforms from foreign governments, no matter how friendly, would broadcast subserviency and a lack of manliness, inviting further European interventions and abrogating Ottoman sovereignty.

During the crisis, Ottoman elites demonstrated their belief that they were honorable, civilized, masculine, and had the right to sovereignty (Hooper 65; Kent 238). Ottoman diplomatic rhetoric during this stage of the crisis is illustrative of what they meant by honor. They were not opposed to advice from representatives of the Great Powers; in fact, they welcomed it, seeking to create a modern empire with a strong government modeled on the Great Powers, though adapted for Ottoman specificities. But they saw it as contradictory to modern diplomatic norms to accept official notes castigating Ottoman governance and demands of specific reforms – they viewed this as a denial of their status as an independent state. This was also recognition of their own relative weakness compared to the Great Powers. As Scott Taylor argues, “honor creates the polite fiction of auton-
omy for those who are, in truth, subordinate, and allows both the dominant and subordinate to accept that this state of affairs is just” (306). The Porte could accept their lesser status so long as the other powers acknowledged them as a civilized and masculine state, ineligible for their imperialism.

**The Rational Use of Violence and Hegemonic Masculinity**

Despite accepting the Andrássy Note, the rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued and spread to the vilâyets (provinces) of Edirne and the Danube (often referred to collectively as Bulgaria). Local Ottoman leaders enrolled başıbozuk (irregular soldiers) to put down the rebellion. British newspapers focused on sensationalized (and often fictional) reports of başıbozuk killing women and children or seizing them for their harems. The British public believed that only the most barbarous of peoples mistreated women (Kent 164), and these reports were proof that Ottomans were not civilized. The Ottomans were not proper men. Ali Bilgiç’s classification is useful here, dividing this into three major groups: hypermasculine, masculine, and feminine. If they were brave and fighters, they were hypermasculinized and thus barbarous; if they were cowards, they were feminine, who needed Ottoman protection. But either way, they were not the right kind of masculine: that is brave, rational, strong, and honorable. The Porte was also defensive, denying the truth of European reports on the massacres. Seeking recognition as a civilized power, the Porte could no longer condone the mistreatment of its Christian subjects. Thus, during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, an Ottoman irregular, Deli Mustafa, could boast of beheading infidels, pillaging Greek villages, and seizing Greek women and children to rape and enslave, all with the knowledge and participation of the Ottoman imperial army (Esmer 3-5). In 1876, however, the Porte could not allow such hypermasculine and barbarous acts while also defending itself as a civilized power.

Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, informed the Ottoman ambassador, Kabulî Pasha, that because Russia’s honor was engaged, it could not ignore further Ottoman Christian deaths (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VII, 344-346). Nor would the principalities of Serbia and Montenegro – both nominally Ottoman provinces – who declared war on the Ottomans on July 2nd. Although Montenegro fared well in its battles, Serbia did not. The difference in how Ottomans depicted the two principalities is telling. Ottoman diplomats complained about Montenegrins mutilating
captured and wounded Ottoman soldiers, cutting off their noses and part of their upper lips. They did not discredit their martial abilities or bravery - both typically markers of masculinity - but instead depicted them as hypermasculine savages, who were not civilized enough to rule themselves. Although at times Ottomans also depicted Serbia as out of control and bloodthirsty (figures 1 and 2), it was more common for them to show Prince Milan and Serbia as a feminized child, essentially playing at war (figure 3). Therefore, neither Montenegrins nor Serbians combined the bravery, martial abilities, and the rational deployment of violence of civilized men who could rule themselves.

By August, the Great Powers were asking the Porte to agree to peace with the principalities based on the status quo ante. The new Grand Vizier, Mehmed Rüşdi Pasha, argued that despite greatly desiring peace, the Porte could not agree to it before Ottoman forces had won a large enough victory to satisfy the nation’s desire to see Serbia punished, alluding to Serbia as a wayward child in need of discipline. Safvet Pasha, again the Foreign Minister, argued that the request for peace should come directly from Milan in order to flatter the amour-propre of Ottomans (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VIII, 146).

In September, the Great Powers insisted on an armistice with the principalities as well as elaborating new administrative reforms for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Safvet complained bitterly about this, stating that, “if the Sublime Porte could forget that it is an independent State that has been victorious...it would not forget that it is still an independent state and that it must prefer an honorable death to dismemberment” (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VIII, 272-273). Mehmed Rüşdi also argued that an international conference discussing internal

![Fig. 2: Prince Milan on His Trone. Source: Hayâl. Caption: “Is it not the desired kingdom? If it is not Serbia, let it be a graveyard.” (Murâd ƙralık değil mi? ƙrbistan olmaz ise ƙabrîstân olsun.)](image)
Ottoman affairs would diminish the Sultan’s prestige in his European provinces (Foreign Office, 424:45, 160). On October 21st, *Punch* succinctly depicted the attitude of the Great Powers. The Ottoman Empire, depicted as a sick and feeble old man, is propped up in a chair holding a large pill labeled *Armistice* while men representing each of the Great Powers tell him that he must take it at once or they are not sure what will happen (figure 4). With all the Great Powers in agreement on holding a conference to discuss reestablishment of peace and new reforms, the Porte acquiesced in hopes it could preserve all its sovereign rights (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” VIII, 408-409).

At the same time, Midhat Pasha’s committee was seeking to complete its draft of an Ottoman constitution, hoping its proposed reforms would satisfy the Great

---

**Fig. 3:** A Serbian Child Wants to Fight the Ottomans. Source: Çaylaḳ. Caption: “Child: ‘Granny, can I also go out with my sword like my father Milan?’ Grandmother: ‘You will go out, my child, but you are too young. You need to grow up a little bit; your father also was only 15-years old when he had gone out.’”


---

**Fig. 4:** The Great Powers Attempt to Force an Armistice on the Ottoman Empire. Source: *Punch*. Caption: “A Pill in Time!”
Powers before the Constantinople Conference began in Istanbul. Nevertheless, Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev, the Russian ambassador, warned Safvet not only that they would not accept the Constitution in lieu of their proposals, the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers would consider its promulgation an insult (Foreign Office, 424:46, 200). However, at the start of the first meeting on December 23rd, Safvet announced that Sultan Abdülhamid II had just promulgated the Constitution. The plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers ignored this proclamation and asked for a response to their proposals at the next session. While Ottoman officials felt that they were elite men with the same status as statesmen of the other great and civilized European empires, the latter viewed the Ottomans as children, in need of their supervision, much as the Ottomans viewed Serbians and Bulgarians (figures 5, 6, and 7). The Porte did not challenge the legitimacy of imperialism or colonialism, only what position they held within this hierarchy. So while they were not yet as explicitly colonialist in seeking to civilize Ottoman subjects as they would be in following decades (Deringil 312), they used gendered colonialist tropes – such as Midhat arguing that Bulgarians were not intelligent enough to rule themselves (Midhat 990) – to justify their imperialism over peoples they viewed as hypermasculine (Montenegrins and Circassians) or too feminine and in need of their protection (Bulgarians and Serbian).

At the final meeting of the Constantinople Conference on January 20, 1877, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries – Safvet and Edhem Pasha – rejected two of the proposals as incompatible with Ottoman honor and sovereignty: that the Porte obtain prior approval before appointing valis (governors) for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria and the formation of an international commission to oversee execution of reforms. Gorchakov took the Ottomans’ refusal as an affront to Europe, telling the British ambassador, Lord Augustus Loftus, that “he had a very red [mark] on him, for we all have received a snub” and Europe
needed to defend its honor (Foreign Office, 424:48, 213). Conversely, Lord Odo Russell, the British ambassador to Germany, told Otto von Bismarck that he believed the Porte’s refusal showed the strength of the Ottomans and the weakness of Russia. Bismarck agreed, but warned that Russia’s failure would humiliate it and drive it to restore its honor in a war that could engulf much of Europe (Foreign Office, 424:48, 17-173).

Before Russia declared war, Count Pyotr Andreyevich Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador to London, informed Musurus that if the Porte concluded peace with Montenegro, showed serious progress in instituting reforms, and sent a special ambassador to meet with Czar Alexander II to discuss simultaneous demobilization, the Czar would accept this overture as he could then do so honorably (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” IX, 100-102). Nevertheless, the Porte refused to send any ambassador (Foreign Office, 424:51, 121). Moreover, although it was not required to sign the London Protocol as the Great Powers had, on April 9th the Porte publicly rejected its terms as a humiliating demand of an independent and civilized power “without example in history” (Kuneralp and Tokay, “The Eastern Question” IX, 188-193). Musurus informed Derby that the contents were so derogatory to the Sultan’s honor and independence that it would be better for the Ottoman Empire to face the consequences of an unsuccessful war against Russia than quietly acquiescing to this protocol (Foreign Office, 424:51, 65). The Porte would not even condescend to sending a special ambassador to the Czar, believing it would be undignified and unmanly of the Sultan to make the first overture for peace.

Austen Henry Layard, the new British ambassador to the Porte, arrived in Istanbul with the goal of maintaining peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Both the Sultan and the new Grand Vizier, Edhem, assured the ambassador of their desire for peace. Edhem promised that, “I would do my utmost to preserve the lives of the tens of thousands of inoffensive, innocent Mussulmans… It could only be a profound conviction that the honour and independence of my country are at stake which could make me hesitate” (Foreign Office, 424:53, 72-75). In a private meeting, Abdülhamid made a similar argument to Layard, who responded that Ottoman diplomacy had
already demonstrated ample proofs of the government’s courage, and it could no longer claim that assenting to Great Power demands now would damage its dignity or independence (Foreign Office, 424:53, 76-78).

Before the Ottoman government suspended the satirical press, Ottoman diplomatic rhetoric and satire on Russia mirrored that on Serbia and Montenegro previously. Ottoman officials focused on Russian war crimes, particularly against Ottoman women and children, and accused Russia of being driven by religious zealotry. Similarly, Ottoman political cartoons typically depicted Russia as a savage bear, or a wild-looking soldier covered in weapons, while Ottomans were shown as easily defeating Russians and protecting cowardly and child-like Ottoman Christians (figures 8 and 9). In short, Ottomans reversed the gendered anti-Ottoman attacks that accused them of being barbarous, religious fanatics and redirected these charges against Russia. Despite a stronger-than-expected resistance at Pleven in Bulgaria, on December 10th, Ottoman forces led by Osman Pasha capitulated to the Russian siege. After signing the Treaty of San Stefano in March, the other Great Powers insisted on a congress to reach a new agreement, which would replace the terms of San Stefano. In July, they and the Ottoman Empire agreed to the Treaty of Berlin. As Ottoman officials had promised throughout the crisis, they accepted a disastrous war and the loss of great swaths of territory in both Europe and Asia. Ottoman officials had not deluded themselves on their chances of victory before the war; they accepted war because they would not accept the humiliation of submitting to foreign interference without a fight, thereby impugning their dignity and right to sovereignty.

Conclusion
Throughout the crisis, Ottoman officials argued that foreign intervention in Ottoman affairs was a direct violation of the Treaty of Paris and quiet acceptance of this would be acquiescence to the abrogation of the treaty and their indepen-
dence and autonomy. Consequently, they rejected any Great Power proposals that even implied European supervision or intervention in internal Ottoman affairs. In Ottoman diplomacy and satirical journals, Ottomans depicted themselves as civilized and masculine, deserving of their independence. Furthermore, they portrayed their rebellious Christian subjects as hypermasculinized or feminized, and so barbarous and still in need of Ottoman tutelage. This rhetoric mirrored that of Europe’s, particularly Russia’s, regarding the Ottomans themselves. Thus, the Ottomans, like the governments and public of the Great Powers, saw masculinity as both a marker of civilized status and legitimation for imperialism.

Finally, the Ottomans encouraged a war they knew they could not win rather than accept European arguments that they were neither civilized nor masculine enough to rule the Empire unsupervised. Similarly, Russia risked provoking Great Britain to war over perceived insults to its honor—a war it promised the Ottomans they could avoid if they humbled themselves to satisfy the Czar’s honor. The primary difference, therefore, between the Ottomans and Great Powers was not the importance the former attached to honor or even its definition of honor; nor was it that Ottoman officials disputed a hierarchy of masculinities. The difference was that Ottomans believed that the Ottoman Empire was civilized, and they therefore had the right to rule over barbaric peoples of their Empire. Great Powers officials, however, viewed the Ottomans as semi-barbarous at best; they could retain what remained of their Empire only so long as they accepted European tutelage and because the balance of power still demanded it.
Notes

1 All translations are the work of the author. For full bibliographical information of the figures in this article, contact the author.

Works Cited


---. “Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey. Part XII. April 1877.” Confidential, vol. 424, no. 51, 1877, pp. 65, 121. www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.


---. “Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey. Part VII. November 1876.” Confidential, vol. 424, no. 45, 1876, p. 160. www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.

---. “Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey. Part VIII. November and December 1876.” Confidential, vol. 424, no. 46, 1876, p. 200. www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.


---. “Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey. Part XII. April 1877.” Confidential, vol. 424, no. 51, 1877, pp. 65, 121. www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.


