A Thug, a Revolutionary or Both?
Negotiating Masculinity in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

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During the eighteen days of the Egyptian revolution, some hundred police stations in popular quarters in Cairo were burned down. Official accounts reported this as the work of baltagiya (thugs). The question of who burned the police stations serves as an entry point to problematizing the identity of baltagiya. Thus, examining the gendered affective registers linked to the baltagi (thug) is essential in understanding the potential of the revolutionary moment and the urgency with which the state had to reinstate the narrative of the baltagi as a dangerous criminal to justify mass violence and speed urban transformation projects.

Keywords: Affect, Emotions, Egypt, Masculinity, Gender, Egyptian Revolution, Urban Poor, Politics from Below

Introduction
Scholars such as Diane Singerman (Avenues of Participation), Farha Ghannam (Live and Die Like a Man), Paul Amar (Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out?) and Salwa Ismail (Youth, Gender and the State in Cairo), who have made substantial contributions in the study of the life and politics of the urban poor in Cairo, had at the heart of their projects local constructions of gender relations. Amar, Ismail and Ghannam have focused on the construction of urban-poor masculinity. Ghannam argues that masculinity in the Middle East is still “under-studied, and under-theorized.” (5) Ghannam notes that the absence of serious scholarly engagement on Middle East masculinity has been coupled with an antagonistic public discourse on Arab and Muslim men (4-5). In this vein, men in the Middle East “are portrayed either as a threat to be crushed or enemies to be subjugated and controlled” (Ghannam 5) Ghannam and Amar among other scholars have identified a gap in critical Middle East masculinity studies. In affect studies a similar gap exists. “While feminist and queer theory were in on the ground floor of developments in affect studies, masculinity studies has been much slower to develop relations to affect” (Reeser and Gottzén 149). Yet scholars
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acknowledge that “affect is a key element of subjectivity and should be factored in to all wings of gender studies” (Reeser and Gottzén 151). According to philosopher Brian Massumi, affect is a nonconscious, pre-lingual bodily intensity that is distinct from emotions, while emotions is what gets verbalized from affect and captured in language. In this paper I subscribe largely to the definitions of affect and emotions developed by Deborah Gould who bases her definitions on the work of Massumi:

I use the term affect to indicate nonconscious and unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and intensity that arise in response to stimuli impinging on the body (...). As a body’s registered sensation of a moment existing relationally, interactively, in the world, affect is an effect of being affected, and an effect that is itself a preparation to act in response, but in no preset or determined way. An affective state is, in other words, unfixed and polygenerative (26).

Gould further explains, “I use the idea of an emotion or emotions to describe what from the potential of bodily intensities gets actualized or concretized in the flow of living” (26).

Western philosophy has an inherit binary that equates men with reason and women with emotions. Reeser and Gottzén have identified a “Cartesian split between body and mind, in which men are inherently associated with reason” (147). Ghannam recognizes this binary and argues against what she calls the “over-embodiment” of women in Western media and academia and the “disembodiment” of men: “By ‘disembodiment’ I mean the tendency to equate men with mind’ (‘aql), culture, reason, honor, and public life, while offering little (if any) discussion of emotions, feelings, or bodily matters” (4). It is essential to adopt an intersectional approach when studying urban-poor masculinity.

According to Ghannam (8) intersectionality can help us understand how male subjectivities are created in intersection with patriarchy and capitalism. The urban poor have been at the heart of what constitutes “the people” in the infamous slogan “the people demand the downfall of the regime”. During the eighteen days, some hundred police stations in popular quarters in Cairo were burned down. Salwa Ismail contests official accounts which reported that this was the work of baltagiya (thugs). The question of who burned the police stations during the eighteen days could serve as an entry point into problematizing the identity of baltagiya rather than simply positing them in opposition to the revolutionaries. The revolutionary moment blurred the lines between who was a thug and who was a revolutionary; since all protestors were outlaws, everyone became a thug. My empirical work has shown that this was moment of subversion and renegotiation of the urban poor’s affective dispositions. Hemmings (564) argues that bodies are captured and held by affective structures, but this revolutionary moment presented an opportunity for an aggressive demarcation of bodies as embedded in disruptions to the gender order. Building on the above accounts and my empirical research, I do not argue for a radical change in the gender order nor for a redefinition of masculinity. Instead I propose an examination of the gendered narratives linked to the baltagi, as these are essential in understanding local politics, the potential of the revolutionary moment and the urgency with which the state had to quickly reinstate the historical narrative of the baltagi as a dangerous criminal in order to justify mass violence, shift blame and speed urban-transformation projects.

The main research questions explored in this paper are how can we understand urban-poor masculinity in the wake of the Arab Spring? How does the Egyptian state demonize the urban subaltern, how do state strategies circulate, and how are they
reinforced in an affective economy (Ahmed 64) of fear? This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork. The data in this paper was collected over two years between 2016 and 2018 during work on my PhD thesis. I used ethnographic methods such as participatory observation of the activities of the Maspero youth alliance, and I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with activists and community leaders of several popular committees in Cairo and Giza.

**A Brief History of Maspero Triangle**

Maspero Triangle is located in the south of the Bulaq abu al-Ila district in downtown Cairo adjacent to Tahrir square and the Egyptian Radio and Television Union headquarters and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Over the years the neighborhood expanded to house around 14,000 inhabitants (Madd Platform). The earthquake in 1992 affected Maspero Triangle as well as most historical areas in Cairo. Several houses needed repairs, however, and the government refused to grant maintenance licenses to the owners and tenants. Prohibiting renovation and restoration was a state strategy to expedite the slow death of the neighborhood; as old buildings collapsed, the government was able to seize the land (Madd Platform 143, [Amnesty International 19]). This continued until 2008 when two things happened that had important consequences for the area under study. The first is that the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) released a project for changing the urban landscape of Cairo called Cairo 2050. The plan envisioned the future Cairo with high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, tourist areas and office towers. The main idea was to modernize Cairo and what this would have meant for the urban poor living in historical areas or downtown Cairo was relocation so as to allow space for foreign investors to develop their mega-projects. Urban scholars heavily criticized the plan (Madd Platform). According to Omnia Khalil, the second incident that happened in 2008 was the collapse of a massive rock on the residents’ of one of Cairo’s informal settlements (Deweqa) leaving at least 119 dead. The devastation was massive and the incident opened a public discussion on the hazardous situation of Cairo’s slums and put pressure on the government to do something about this problem. Thus, the Informal Settlements Development Fund was established in 2008 (ISDF). ISDF classified 4,004 areas, where 85,000 people live, as unsafe based on international criteria set by UN-Habitat (Khalil). The people in these areas have been slated for relocation. According to ISDF, the neighborhood of Maspero Triangle is considered an unsafe area due to unsuitable living conditions. As a result, the Cairo governorate intensified its forced evacuations. In an attempt to organize themselves and coordinate a response, the youth of the Maspero Triangle established the The Voluntary Alliance of the Youth and People of Maspero in Defense of the Land and Housing Rights. Despite community organizing and local activism, the Cairo governorate continued evictions while aided by a legal framework that gives the state the power to evict residents without necessarily providing compensation or alternative housing (Amnesty International 29).

**Policing Youth**

Evictions, possible evictions, and encounters with the police feature prominently in all of my interlocutors’ narratives. Evictions intensified clashes with the police in an already highly securitized area. Mohamed, a resident of Maspero Triangle told me about one of those encounters. In 2010 they called me at my work and told me that the police were in the neighborhood evacuating some of the buildings. It was a strange rainy day. I went to the area and found that the police had created a security cordon around the alley where I lived. I had been working against evictions since 2001; I had been following this dream
for nine years and abandoned all my personal goals. Suddenly I felt that all my efforts had disappeared into thin air because of their laws. They threw people's stuff on the streets. I pushed against the officers to break the cordon, I did not care, the dream was over so why should I live. They kept pushing me back until the sheriff saw me. This was the second confrontation between us. The sheriff came and asked who I was and what did I want? I told him I lived here and I worked as a teacher so that they would not then put their security on to me. I asked him if he had notified the residents that he would be coming here today to throw their stuff in the streets. His deputy replied by saying that they had notified the people three days before. I gathered the people around and asked them if anyone had received a notice that the police would come in three days to throw their stuff in the street. They all said no. I contacted human rights organizations and told them that the police were here and had created a security cordon and were throwing people's stuff in the street and that they might arrest some of the residents. They said that they would come right away. When they arrived I asked them to take pictures and document what was happening. The sheriff gave an order to prohibit journalists from coming into the area and taking any pictures (Mohamed Interview, 2016). This is only one encounter of many that the residents of the neighborhood had to endure and that structured their relationship with the state. The police specifically targeted active male youth such as Mohamed because they were outspoken and able to contact the media and human rights organizations and mobilize people. Targeting young urban-poor men was not specific to the Maspero neighborhood; however, the threat of evictions intensified the scrutiny. Ismail (224) analyzes the changes in state-society relations in Egypt as the role of the state changes from welfare provision to securitization. According to Ismail “Youths in the Middle East, especially young men, have been important actors in oppositional movements in the region” (224). This made them prone to being targeted by the state. Laws such as the law on thuggery (Qanun al-Baltaga) that was passed in 1998 enabled the state to police young urban men in poor neighborhoods and conduct police raids in these areas or undertake arrest campaigns. Ismail argues that understanding young men’s oppositional relation to the state is essential in the construction of their masculinity: “The management of young men’s public presence is a particular preoccupation of state authorities, especially the police” (235). The young men from Bulaq Abu al-Ila and the Maspero Triangle recounted numerous stories about their encounters with the police. Mahmoud told me about one of his experiences that resonated with all the other young men and they all said that they had had a similar experience. Mahmoud, who is from Bulaq Abu al-Ila and in his mid-twenties, was one day walking around downtown when a police officer stopped him and asked him to present his ID card, a practice that is followed by the police and called suspicion and investigation (ishtibah wa tahari). Mahmoud presented his ID card to the officer, when the officer saw the address on his ID card he asked him if he was from Bulaq and what was he doing downtown. Mahmoud told me the story laughingly because the question was absurd, Bulaq is downtown and in fact he was very close to his neighborhood - just not in it. Ismail notes that these everyday confrontations are over “territorial markings” (225), and based on her fieldwork in a neighborhood similar to Maspero Triangle she argues, “For young men, urban space is map-
ped out in terms of zones of relative safety or danger” (236). The everyday encounters of young men from popular areas with the state has pushed them into developing spatial identities related to where they live: “The issue of the territorial identity of youth deserves closer attention when examining questions of activism and youth relations with the state. Territorial markings are lines drawn in contest. Thus, to produce a territorial identity is to establish spatial title in relation to others, including the state” (Ismail 225). These territorial identities can help explain the affective attachments that the people from popular quarters develop to their neighborhoods as well as the difficulty of eviction and relocation policies. Ismail notes that state strategies to control young men from urban-poor areas are imbedded in the anti-terrorism narrative, which draws a link between the state configuration of the balatgi and the terrorist (236).

Ismail emphasizes that the problem of thuggery has been associated in official and media discourses with informal housing and urban-poor neighborhoods (Ismail, “The Egyptian Revolution against the Police” 451). Ismail builds on Connell’s (80-81) notion of “marginalized masculinities” to explain how the antagonistic relation between the state and the urban-poor youth serves to structure their masculinity. “Marginalized masculinities are inflicted with the humiliation experienced at the hands of agents of the state and with the absence of any shield from state repression such as higher class status” (Ismail, “Youth, Gender and the State in Cairo” 231). Consequently, Ismail argues that men negotiate their “injured masculinity” (223) by attempting to dominate women through the policing of their public and private behavior. I contest Ismail’s argument based on my fieldwork. But the concept of marginalized masculinity can be helpful in capturing the experience of urban-poor male youth; and in spite of my male interlocutors’ conservative narratives on gender norms, what I observed in the field is young men negotiating their marginalized masculinity by building alliances with women who are also oppressed by local patriarchal structures. This is attributed to the Egyptian revolution that revamped local politics and opened up more space for youth and women to play a bigger role in their community. I attended some of the meetings organized by the Maspero youth alliance that aimed at discussing possible ways to resist evictions. One of the things that I observed was the alliance and coordination between women and youth of the neighborhood, especially within the framework of the Maspero youth alliance. The fact that women played an important role in local activism was not itself a surprise, what was interesting was how this contradicted the narrative of young male activists when I asked them about the role of women in the Maspero youth alliance. Ismail encountered the same phenomenon during her fieldwork. In discussing the role of women as mediators with the state, she says, “The role of women in mediating this experience of state domination is pushed out of men’s narratives. Rather, male youths insist that women are idle gossipers, doing little but displaying their feminine wiles” (“Youth, Gender and the State in Cairo” 231). Similarly, whenever I asked young male activists about the role of their female counterparts, they usually downplayed women’s role as merely auxiliary to their own efforts. Contrary to this narrative, in practice young male activists and women in the Maspero Triangle seemed to coordinate and collaborate in pushing their agenda forward. Young male activists relied heavily on women’s community outreach, organization skills, and negotiation abilities. What was obvious from this meeting as well as others was that young male activists worked closely with women in Maspero and Bulaq. Even when their male counterparts did not acknowledge this
role, young women played an integral part in local activism and popular committees. Women engaged in building a local alliance with young male activists in their neighborhoods that enabled them albeit temporarily to disrupt old networks of power. In Bulaq a woman named Abu al-Ill Salma, in her early thirties and a member of the Bulaq Abu al-Ill popular committee, decided to run for parliamentary elections in 2014. Local young male and female activists who saw in her the possibility of representing their voice in the parliament ran Salma’s election campaign. Salma and her campaign knew that they had small chance of winning but they wanted to make a point that a female candidate can run in their neighborhood. Salma was not the only one; Nazra for Feminist Studies published a report in 2012 profiling sixteen female candidates who ran in the parliamentary elections after the revolution. Women were empowered after the revolution to join formal politics and seek representation. This was also reflected in local politics through the alliance between women and youth in popular committees that could have led to a change in the gender dynamic had it been able to continue. Escalating violence, political polarization and security threats have led to the disbanding of most of the popular committees.

Reinstating Fear: The Making of the baltagi and the Terrorist
In the Maspero massacre, people from the Bulaq Abu al-Illa and Maspero neighborhoods were implicated as perpetrators of violence. According to a press release from EIPR following the incident, “people in civilian clothes joined the army’s assault on protesters. A large number of witnesses stated that these were Muslims from the areas of Bulaq Abu al-Illa and Ghamra.” In the Maspero neighborhood the question as to any involvement of the residents in the Maspero massacre was a controversial one. Residents had different accounts of the night and their involvement in it. Abdou’s account, one of my main interlocutors in the Maspero Triangle, shows a certain awareness, political intent and engagement with the incident.

The stance of the alliance (Maspero youth alliance) throughout the past few years has always been revolutionary (...). State media outlets claimed that people from the Bulaq Abu al-Illa and Maspero Triangle neighborhoods were the ones who killed the Coptic protestors. In response, a large march was organized from Bulaq Abu al-Illa to express solidarity with Coptic protestors and protest SCAF and to accuse SCAF of spreading lies and deluding the people. The protestors in the march announced officially that Copts are a part of us and we would never hurt them. We announced officially that the military was the one who attacked Coptic protestors and we were the ones who were treating the injured in our neighborhood. There are things that happened in Bulaq Abu al-Illa that are central to the history of the revolution and its truth and the reality of the role of people from popular neighborhoods in the revolution and Bulaq was at the forefront. Specifically because this neighborhood and its people lived the revolution, so they always took a stance and were always accused of being thugs and having killed the Copts. The reaction was two thousand people from the popular committee and the alliance marching from Bulaq Abu al-Illa to protest SCAF and Tantawy and say that they were the ones who killed the Copts (...). Two weeks after we announced the solidarity of the people of Bulaq Abu al-Illa with Coptic protestors – that we supported their sit-in, that the neighborhood was open to them to counter the rumors that were circulating, and we published the statements on Facebook and other websi-
tes - the army broke up the sit-in. The Coptic sit-in was dispersed, some died, some were injured but we protested. The media claimed that the people of Bulaq Abu al-Ila beat the Copts, so we organized marches to protest SCAF and called for the downfall of the military regime. The Copts joined this protest and we announced to all the media outlets that the army was responsible and that we as the people of Bulaq Abu al-Ila were here protesting this. We chanted this in front of everyone. Bulaq had clear stances and opposed all regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood, SCAF and Mubarak (Abdou Interview, 2016).

As evinced in Abdou’s narrative, in 2011 Maspero was one of the most militant neighborhoods - along with many in downtown and old Cairo - in defending the occupation of Tahrir square. As Maspero was adjacent to Tahrir, it played a crucial role in sustaining the square during the eighteen days. However, the thuggery narratives were used to vilify the urban poor and undermine their politics. According to Amar (308), these orientalist tropes of thuggery are not new; they are in fact imbedded in a historical colonial tradition. Sara Ahmed reminds us that “fear opens up past histories of association” (63) which distinguishes bodies from each other in the present. Ahmed argues that fear works to contain some bodies such that they take up less space. In this way, emotions work to align bodily space with social space (...). In other words, fear works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others (69).

According to Ahmed, “fear may also work as an affective economy” (64). In this vein, racialized fear of Middle East maleness circulates in a global affective economy governed by tropes of thuggery and terrorism. Amar argues:

Of course, ‘time bomb masculinity’ is also just a dumbed-down or depoliticized version of the ‘suicide bomber’ trope, which has become the justification for ratcheting up surveillance and undercutting civil liberties in the Middle East, as well as in European cities. In this sense, it represents the ultimate militarization of the respectability discourse of urban modernity (316).

The Arab Spring defied the exceptionalism of the Arab region and produced images that contradicted the traditional tropes of the Arab street and the discourses of masculinity in crisis. In this sense, it disrupted the global affective economy of fear surrounding the unruly Arab masses. These problematic notions were used to justify the war on terror, occupations, and the policing of certain bodies dating back to colonial rule. This disruption caused a crisis of legitimacy for the Egyptian regime that legitimizes its dictatorial rule internationally based on control of the uncivilized mob. Moreover, it opened up a space for the renegotiation of the depiction of the Arab street. This challenge was unwelcomed by not only domestic forces but also international ones. Two main tropes, the baltagi and the terrorist, have been masterfully used by the Egyptian state in a manner that feeds into and is in synchronization with a global affective economy of fear. These narratives culminated in General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi declaring a war on terror in 2013.

I have a request for Egyptians, next Friday all honorable and honest Egyptians should go on the streets to give me a mandate and an order to fight the potential violence and terrorism.

On the 24th of July 2013, General Abd El Fattah al-Sisi declared war on terror and he demanded that honorable Egyptians take to the streets to sanction his fight against any impending terrorism. The key word here is potential. Brian Massumi explains the futurity of threat and the role of feelings in creating and sustaining a threat.
What is not actually real can be felt into being. Threat does have an actual mode of existence: fear, as foreshadowing. Threat has an impending reality in the present. This actual reality is affective. Fear is the anticipatory reality in the present of a threatening future. It is the felt reality of the nonexistent, loomingly present as the affective fact of the matter (Massumi 53-54).

Thus, the felt reality can supersede the actual reality and the affective fact of the matter can replace the actual facts: “If we feel a threat, there was a threat. Threat is affectively self-causing” (Massumi 54). The threat is real as long as it feels real; consequently, the decision to act upon that feeling is justified. The felt reality of the threat of violence became the deciding factor that mobilized thousands on the day of the mandate for al-Sisi to commit one of the most horrendous massacres in Egypt’s modern history: the Rabaa massacre. And it did not end here. Massumi argues that the fact that a threat has been actualized does not mean that it is not real but rather that it will remain real forever: “The future threat is forever” (53). The threat remains ready to be utilized whenever necessary. By declaring the war on terror, al-Sisi created a threat that legitimized preemptive action against a threat he had called into being. During the summer of 2013, General Abd El Fattah al-Sisi managed to create an “atmosphere of fear” (Massumi 61) that subsumed every felt problem in Egypt under the rubric of terrorism. Massumi suggests an ecological approach in understanding how different regimes of power interact and develop together. He claims,

To understand the political power of threat and the preemptive politics availing itself of threat-potential, it is necessary to situate preemptive power in a field of interaction with other regimes of power (Massumi 62).

The main argument is that fear resonates and gains momentum through its circulation internationally. These regimes of power not only interact with but are largely dependent on each other. These narratives are interdependent and feed into a global atmosphere of fear (Massumi 61) or an affective economy of fear (Ahmed 64). Sara Ahmed argues that (79) the function of the terrorist narrative is to expand the power to detain and control certain bodies. Fear could be associated with some bodies but the sliding of fear justifies the expansion of power as needed. And the threat is always present and real because the figure of the terrorist is always shifting. Fear is associated with certain bodies but does not reside in a single figure, the terrorist, the protestor, the baltagi; these categories can all collapse into one another and therefore justify state control of these bodies.

Conclusion

After years of confusion and uncertainty, amid rumors of imminent forced evictions, the deputy minister of housing held a meeting with Maspero residents in 2017 and announced three alternatives. The first was monetary compensation for the demolition of their properties, amounting to $5,000 (U.S.); the second was relocation to Asmarat (a social housing project for people removed from informal areas); and the third was taking apartments in the Maspero Triangle after the development project had been completed. Uncertainty and a lack of faith in the government’s plan led many to choose monetary compensation or relocation to Asmarat. This ended residents’ dreams of staying in Maspero after its development, leaving only some 900 families who chose to remain in the neighborhood. Whether or not the government will give residents their promised housing units remains to be seen. There were some gains from the process however – residents benefited from interaction with architects, urban researchers and civil society activists, and were able to negotiate some possible gains from the governorate, such as the
promise that 900 families would have a place in Maspero after development of the area, although this remains to be seen. Geographer Nigel Thrift argues that interaction between space, bodies and affect is linked to political consequences. He suggests that affect is politically engineered and restructured in urban everyday life with varying political motivations. This can include the erasure of emotional histories, creating new affective registers, or mobilizing old ones (Thrift 172). Thus, it is not farfetched to argue that the urban restructuring of cities can elicit or inhibit political responses. The wider plan of the Egyptian government to drastically change downtown Cairo, a space that witnessed a revolution, has interlinked political and affective goals. It aims to expunge the affective register of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and impede the politics of the urban poor.

The narratives around thuggery were used to vilify the urban poor and undermine their politics. The protestor became a terrorist or a baltagi or both depending on their political affiliation and social class. Fear contains certain bodies and expands others. Fear sticks to the bodies of protestors and defines them as possible thugs or terrorists. We live in a global economy of fear built around the fear of Middle East bodies denoted as terrorists. The early days of the Arab revolutions opened up a space to radically distinguish these bodies from terrorists and to label them as protestors calling for democracy. It was a moment that challenged a global order and questioned the legitimacy of an international security regime that targets Arab, Muslim or Middle East bodies. Thus, invoking the terrorist trope was not only an easy way to attack political Islam but also a trope that echoes international security paradigms and relegates Middle East bodies to their preassigned place.

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The Maspero Massacre started as a peaceful demonstration mainly by Coptic citizens protesting against discrimination on Oct. 9, 2011. It was violently dispersed, 28 people were killed and more than 300 were injured.


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For an overview of the role of popular committee see Cilja Harders and Dina Wahba “New Neighborhood Power: Informal Popular Committees and Changing Local Governance in Egypt” www.tcf.org/content/report/new-neighborhood-power/.

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